tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16257936857050979382023-11-16T23:06:02.503+07:00The MurmurPHILOSOPHY'SHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.comBlogger58125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-57969384639968069632015-08-14T00:30:00.003+07:002015-08-14T00:30:20.968+07:00Renungan ๐ผ Sayyidina Umar bin Khaththab R.A berkata;
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span>Tak ada kenikmatan setelah kenikmatan Islam yg lebih besar dari pada berteman dgn org shalih, jika kau mendapatkan maka jagalah pertemananmu dgn nya..
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _2hb"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><br />
๐ผ Asy-Syafi'i berkata:
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span>Jika kau mempunyai teman yg setia padamu, membantu-mu dlm ketaatan maka jgn pernah kau putuskan dia!
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span>Menjadi teman yg baik itu susah dan memutuskan nya gampang sekali..
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _2hb"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><br />
๐ผ Imam Hasan al-Bashri berkata:
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span>Kami lebih mencintai teman yg shalih dari pada keluarga dan anak, krn keluarga dan anak lebih sering mengingatkan kita pada dunia, tapi teman yg baik akan selalu mengingatkan kita pada akhirat, dan ciri mereka adalah siap berkorban utk kita..
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _2hb"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><br />
๐ผ Lukman alhakim menasihati anaknya:<br />
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span>Wahai anakku setelah kau mendapatkan keimanan pada Allah, maka carilah teman yg baik dan tulus..
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span> Perumpamaan teman yg baik seperti "pohon" jika kau duduk di bawahnya dia dpt menaungi-mu, jika kau mengambil buahnya dpt kau makan..
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qz"></span>Jika ia tak bermanfaat utk mu ia juga tak akan membahayakan-mu..
<span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _2hb"></span><span class="_1az _1a- _4_qs"></span><br />
๐ผ Ya Allah bimbing kami utk selalu mendapat teman yg baik hingga selalu bersama di dunia dan akhirat di bawah panji Rasulullah Saw..<br />
Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-74374238522163157152015-04-03T21:21:00.000+07:002015-04-03T21:21:23.798+07:00Philosopy #14We all long for Eden and we are constantly glimpsing it: our whole nature is still soaked with the sense of exile. #TolkienHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-84013704314826619782015-04-01T09:30:00.000+07:002015-03-08T02:32:01.037+07:00Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia. Chapter Three<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
Chapter Three<br />
The Radical Traditionalism<br />
of the Nahdlatul Ulama in<br />
Indonesia: A Personal<br />
Account of the 26th National<br />
Congress, June 1979,<br />
Semarang*<br />
<br />
Mitsuo Nakamura<br />
<br />
Introduction: An Apparent Paradox of the Nahdlatul Ulama<br />
<br />
The Nahdlatul Ulama (literally, 'The Awakening of Islamic<br />
Scholars') is one of the oldest Islamic religious organisations in<br />
Indonesia. It was established in 1926 as an association of ulama,<br />
i.e., Islamic scholars and teachers, as well as ordinary Muslims<br />
who followed strictly the Sunni orthodoxy of Islam.1 After a<br />
half-century's history, the Nahdlatul Ulama, or the NU as it is<br />
commonly abbreviated, is reported to have grown to be the<br />
largest of all Islamic religious organisations or, for that matter,<br />
of all non-governmental organisations in Indonesia today in<br />
terms of membership and organisational strength.2<br />
I had the opportunity of attending the 26th National<br />
Congress of the Nahdlatul Ulama held in the city of Semarang,<br />
the provincial capital of Central Java, for seven days from the<br />
5-11 June 1979. My experience with the NU prior to this<br />
occasion was not only meagre but somewhat biased. I first came<br />
into contact with some NU members while I was doing<br />
anthropological field work in the Central Javanese town of<br />
Kotagede from 1970 to 1972.3 The NU in the town was,<br />
however, rather insignificant in its size and influence, for it was<br />
over-shadowed by the Muhammadiyah, the so-called reformist<br />
rival of the NU, which dominated the religious sphere of the<br />
town. Doctrinal and organisational conflicts between the<br />
Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah coloured part of the<br />
pre-War history of the town, as they did elsewhere. But these<br />
conflicts were already things of the past and the NU itself was<br />
regarded as largely irrelevant by most of the Muhammadiyah<br />
members, who made up a large portion of the informants for my<br />
study. In this situation, I did not feel any disagreement with a<br />
characterisation of the Nahdlatul Ulama widespread among<br />
Western students of Indonesia that it was the organisation of old<br />
and old-fashioned ulama in the countryside of Java who were<br />
religiously traditional, intellectually unsophisticated, politically<br />
opportunistic, and culturally syncretic.4 In other words, I did not<br />
think much of the NU as a subject of study.<br />
Yet several developments during the 1970s have since aroused<br />
my curiosity about the Nahdlatul Ulama. Politically, the NU has<br />
emerged as the boldest and most defiant critic of the New Order<br />
government.5 The NU has not only withstood the merciless<br />
onslaught of the government upon the existence of any social<br />
forces independent of it but has even developed broad criticism<br />
of the development strategy of the current regime.6 There are<br />
emerging from among the NU circles a number of young<br />
intellectuals who are seeking alternative development inspired by<br />
Islamic social ethics.7 Young, well educated ulama and 'lay-<br />
activists' are growing as a new leadership of the NU at all levels<br />
of its organisation. The stereotype of the NU as 'a gerontocratic<br />
organisation of opportunistic and unsophisticated rustic ulama<br />
seems to have become less appropriate in view of the reality of<br />
the NU today, if indeed, it ever was justifiable.<br />
Religiously, however, the NU's traditionalism seems to have<br />
remained intact. It proudly calls itself ahlus sunnah wal<br />
jama'ah, 'the people of the Sunna (the tradition of the Prophet<br />
Muhammad) and of the community,' and its members remain<br />
strict followers of the Sunni tradition. It treasures the institution<br />
of pondok-pesantren, the rural Islamic boarding school, where<br />
the traditional scholarship of ulama is maintained, transmitted,<br />
and regenerated.8 Hence I was puzzled by the paradox of political<br />
radicalism and religious traditionalism within the recent<br />
developments of the Nahdlatul Ulama. I was also curious about<br />
whether this paradox had anything to do with the organisational<br />
strength of the NU. So I attended the 26th congress of the NU<br />
held in Semarang full of curiosity and hoping to learn as much as<br />
possible about the organisation first-hand. The experience I<br />
gained at the NU congress met these expectations. Most<br />
importantly, I realised that there was only an apparent paradox<br />
in the conjunction of political radicalism and religious<br />
traditionalism within the NU. In fact, what I had seen as a<br />
paradox was illusory, caused primarily by a prejudice in my own<br />
perception that radicalism could not co-exist with traditionalism.<br />
The fact of the matter is, however, not that the NU is becoming<br />
politically radical despite its religious traditionalism but that it is<br />
becoming politically radical precisely because of its religious<br />
traditionalism. It seems, therefore, no contradiction to talk<br />
about the radical traditionalism of the Nahdiatul Ulama. The key<br />
to resolving this apparent paradox seems to lie in an<br />
understanding of the organisational features of the NU as an<br />
Islamic religious association of the Sunni tradition.<br />
I would like to expand this point in the rest of my paper as<br />
follows: in Section II ,which immediately follows, I shall present<br />
an account of my personal observation of the NU congress; in<br />
Section III, I shall develop, on the basis of my observations,<br />
some points of analysis and interpretation of what I call the<br />
radical traditionalism of the NU; and finally, in Section IV, J<br />
shall conclude this paper with a few remarks on the study of<br />
religion and politics.<br />
<br />
Field Observation: The Militancy of Local Delegates<br />
<br />
I spent most of the seven-day period of the NU congress<br />
attending and observing its plenary sessions and commission<br />
meetings and I mingled with local delegates as much as possible<br />
by eating, talking, staying, sleeping, bathing, and commuting to<br />
and from the congress with them in the same accommodation<br />
and facilities provided by the congress organisers.9 I learned so<br />
many new things within that very short period of seven days<br />
that it is still difficult for me to present a comprehensive picture<br />
of what took place at the congress.10<br />
Certainly, this NU congress was conspicuous for one feature,<br />
that is, the militancy on the floor of the local delegates vis-a-vis<br />
the central leadership. As far as I know, all reports on the<br />
congress in the Indonesian mass media unfailingly mentioned<br />
this fact.11 It seemed to me, then, that the appreciation of the<br />
significance of this phenomenon of local militancy might lead us<br />
to an understanding of the congress and of the NU as a whole.<br />
Therefore, I have focussed on this aspect of the congress, at the<br />
expense of others, in representing a brief account of my<br />
observations in this section.12<br />
<br />
The Reports of the Central Executive Council<br />
<br />
The first half of the seven-day congress was spent in what<br />
may be termed a grand dialogue between the Central Executive<br />
Council and the local delegates of the NU in discussing the<br />
former's performance since the last national congress held in<br />
Surabaya eight years earlier. First, the congress heard the 'reports<br />
of responsibility' (laporan pertanggung-jawaban) presented by<br />
Idham Chalid, the general chairman and the Achmad Sjaichu, a<br />
chairman of the Central Executive Council, Tanfidziah.13 They<br />
were followed by the presentation of responses and views from<br />
the local delegates, in geographic order with a set limit of time<br />
for each speaker. Then the Central Executive Council took its<br />
turn again and replied to the local delegates. Finally, the congress<br />
made a decision on whether to accept the reports of the Central<br />
Executive Council.<br />
In reviewing the past performance of the Central Executive<br />
Council, Jdham Chalid covered general, external and political<br />
aspects, while Achmad Sjaichu covered internal, organisational<br />
and business aspects. In their respective reports, both Idham<br />
Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu emphasised the fact that the period<br />
of eight years since the last congress had been full of challenges,<br />
difficulties, and even threats to the very existence of the NU.<br />
There had been a major modification in the organisation, i.e.,<br />
the relinquishment of its political activities to the newly formed<br />
Development Unity Party, or PPP, and the reaffirmation of its<br />
status as a religious association. This change had caused a lot of<br />
sadness, disappointment and even anger from within and without<br />
the organisation. But, in the end, the NU had survived the ordeal.<br />
'Alhamdulillah, we thank God, the Compassionate,' exclaimed<br />
Idham Chalid, 'that we have survived and we have returned to<br />
the status of the NU prior to 1952 in original quality but in much<br />
larger quantities (dalam kwalitas yang asli tetapi dalam<br />
kwantitas yang lebih besar). We are to consolidate ourselves<br />
through this congress. After the phase of consolidation, we will<br />
be able to hope for continuous growth in the future' (Idham<br />
Chalid 1979].<br />
<br />
The Response of the Local Delegates<br />
<br />
To an outside observer like myself, the reports by the two<br />
leaders sounded reasonable. Therefore, I was surprised to observe<br />
that their reports were severely criticised by the overwhelming<br />
majority of the local delegates who occupied the podium for the<br />
following two full days to present their responses. Altogether,<br />
about 40 speakers presented the views of the local branches.<br />
Some common points of criticism which emerged from their<br />
speeches included the following: (a) the Central Executive<br />
Council was not active in representing and defending local<br />
branches which had been faced with extreme pressures from the<br />
outside, pressures which in some cases had led to the point of<br />
physical extinction, especially during the two general election<br />
periods of 1971 and 1977; (b) the Central Executive Council was<br />
secretive about its own activities vis-a-vis the local branches,<br />
especially with regard to aid and grants received from Muslim<br />
countries overseas; and (c) the format of the reports of the<br />
Central Executive Council was inadequate in that the program<br />
adopted at the 25th Surabaya Congress was not used to evaluate<br />
its performance.<br />
Besides these points of substance, more characteristic still was<br />
the tone of outright defiance of the authority of the Central<br />
Executive Council expressed in the speeches of a number of the<br />
local delegates. They asserted that the NU's survival owed very<br />
little to the Central Executive Council but a great deal to the<br />
efforts of the local branches. The local branches were entitled to<br />
exercise their sovereignty: 'If there are no local branches, the<br />
central leadership will not exist (Kalau tidak ada cabang, tidak<br />
akan ada PB [Pengurus Besar, lit. Big Management])'-a<br />
delegate from Jakarta shouted in the face of the Central<br />
Executive Council. 'The sovereignty of the local branches<br />
(kedaulatan cabang) should be the order of the day'-many<br />
other delegates echoed the slogan of the Jakarta delegate. Some<br />
of them asserted determinedly: 'We should make a clean sweep<br />
of those irresponsive and irresponsible elements when we have<br />
the election of a new leadership in this congress.' 'Rats called<br />
politicians (tikus-tikus yang disebut politikus) must get out of the<br />
NU leadership from now on,' a delegate from West Sumatra<br />
boldly proclaimed, and received sympathetic applause from<br />
many of his colleagues on the floor.<br />
All but a few speakers expressed some degree of criticism of<br />
the Central Executive Council. Speakers from East, West and<br />
Central Java, the areas providing the largest numbers of<br />
delegates, were the most vocal in denouncing the performance of<br />
the Central Executive Council over the past eight years.14 They<br />
simply and clearly stated that they were not able to accept the<br />
reports of the Central Executive Council: tidak dapat menerima<br />
sama sekali laporan pertanggung-jawaban PB.<br />
<br />
The reply of the Central Executive Council<br />
<br />
When the speeches by the local delegates were finally over,<br />
towards the end of the fourth day, it was then the turn of Idham<br />
Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu to respond to these storms of<br />
criticism. In giving their replies, the two leaders again spoke<br />
separately. And in responding to the local delegates' criticisms,<br />
they performed remarkably differently.<br />
Idham Chalid did not attempt to defend himself or the Central<br />
Executive Council. Instead, he completely surrendered to the<br />
critics. He stated that he was responsible for all the mistakes the<br />
Central Executive Council had committed and he could only beg<br />
for the forgiveness of the delegates (minta ma'af sebesar-<br />
besarya). He praised the militancy of the local delegates in<br />
criticising the central leadership. He said that he was very proud<br />
to see that democracy was vigorously alive in the NU, a genuine<br />
kind of democracy which would be hard to find anywhere else in<br />
Indonesia. In concluding this reply, he expressed the hope that<br />
the new leadership would learn from the old leadership's<br />
mistakes, including his own, and be able to avoid any repetition<br />
of similar errors. I felt as if I had been watching a show of magic,<br />
for Idham Chalid's straightforward 'forgive me' (minta ma'af<br />
speech received long enthusiastic applause from the floor, and<br />
thus his authority was obviously re-established.<br />
In contrast, Achmad Sjaichu tried to fight back against the<br />
criticisms of the local delegates by explaining in detail particular<br />
actions of the Central Executive Council. For example, he said<br />
that the scholarship aid from Saudi Arabia had indeed arrived and<br />
had already been distributed to a number of pesantren which met<br />
the academic standards and qualifications specified by the donor;<br />
however, a public announcement about this scholarship program<br />
had not been made for fear of an indiscriminate rush of<br />
applications from a large number of unqualified pesantren.15<br />
When Achmad Sjaichu ended his speech of self-defence, only<br />
weak applause was heard.16<br />
<br />
The Election of the New Leadership<br />
<br />
The contrast between Idham Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu in<br />
terms of their respective performance in response to the<br />
criticisms from the local delegates during the first half of the<br />
congress was very obvious and seemed to forecast their later<br />
performance in the election of the new leadership which became<br />
the climax of the second half of the congress. In the election<br />
held on the seventh and last day of the congress, those two<br />
leaders competed for the position of general chairman of the<br />
Central Executive Council, Tanfidziah. Idham Chalid, who had<br />
begged for the forgiveness of the local delegates, defeated<br />
Achmad Sjaichu by a two to one majority in popular ballots from<br />
the floor. Achmad Sjaichu thereafter completely withdrew from<br />
the national leadership of the NU.<br />
<br />
Analysis and Interpretation of Field Information<br />
<br />
In this section, I would like to delineate, first of all, some<br />
structural features of the NU organisation as background<br />
information for the interpretation of my field observation<br />
presented in the previous section. Then I shall proceed to<br />
analyse and interpret my field information in three sub-sections<br />
as follows: (a) the significance of the reports by the Central<br />
Executive Council; (b) 'central' vs. 'local' in the NU<br />
organisation; and (c) the implications of personal rivalry<br />
between Idham Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu and the outcome of<br />
their electoral contest. Finally, I shall conclude this section with<br />
a general discussion of what I call the radical traditionalism of<br />
the Nahdlatul Ulama.<br />
<br />
The Structural Features of the NU Organisation<br />
<br />
In the introduction of this paper I stated that the Nahdlatul<br />
Uiama adheres to the orthodoxy of Sunni which, according to its<br />
followers, goes back to the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad<br />
himself and has been transmitted through unbroken chains of<br />
ulama to this day (sanad). In the NU circles the ulama are<br />
regarded and respected as the most learned and most reliable<br />
interpreters of the Qur'an, the Message of God, and of the<br />
Sunna, the records of the deeds and words of the Prophet<br />
Muhammad. The ulama are the most authentic guides for the<br />
faithful to follow in pursuing a religiously righteous way of life.<br />
The ulama are, therefore, called the primary pillar, tiang utama,<br />
of the community of the faithful, umat (Achmad Siddiq 1979:13]<br />
The ulama are thus the spiritual leaders of the faithful. But<br />
they are not clergymen, for Islam does not know ecclesiastical<br />
orders. The social standing of an ulama depends on the respect<br />
he commands from his local community as well as on the<br />
consensual recognition he receives from among a wide network<br />
of his ulama colleagues. He is, therefore, himself the ultimate<br />
unit of authority and autonomy. The NU is essentially a<br />
horizontal confederation or collegial alliance of such<br />
autonomous ulama, not a monolithic, centralised hierarchy.<br />
The organisational structure of the Nahdlatul Ulama seems to<br />
embody well those two aspects of the Sunni tradition described<br />
above, i.e. (a) the spiritual leadership of the ulama vis-a-vis the<br />
community of the faithful, and (b) the collegial solidarity among<br />
the ulama. From the central to the local levels of the NU<br />
organisation, the structure of the leadership at each level is<br />
characterised by the presence of the two tiers of councils, i.e.,<br />
the religious council, Syuriah, and the executive council,<br />
Tanfidziah (see Fig. 1). The religious councils consist exclusively<br />
of the ulama and occupy a superior position of legislative and<br />
supervisory function over the executive councils, which consist<br />
of both the ulama and 'lay-activists' and are in charge of day-<br />
to-day affairs. An official document of the NU defines the two<br />
councils as follows:<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> Syuriah is the highest leadership (pimpinan tertinggi)<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>which functions to develop (membina), guide (membimbing),<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>direct(mengarah), and supervise (mengawasi) the activities<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>of the Nahdlatul Ulama. Tanfidziah is the daily executor<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>(pelaksana sehari-hari) [Nahdlatul Ulama 1979a: 17].<br />
<br />
Figure 1: Leadership Structure of the Nahdlatul Ulama<br />
<br />
========================================================================<br />
Administrative Levels<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Leadership Levels<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
Centre<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Religious Council (Syuriah) <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Pengurus<br />
(Pusat)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Executive Council (Tanfidziah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Besar (PB)<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
Province <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Religious Council (Syuriah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Pengurus<br />
(Propinsi) <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Executive Council (Tanfidziah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Wilayah<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------ <br />
Regency/Municipality <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Religious Council (Syuriah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Pengurus<br />
(Kabupaten/ <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Executive Council (Tanfidziah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Cabang<br />
Kotamadya)<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
Subdistrict <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Religious Council (Syuriah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Pengurus<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Majelis<br />
(Kecamatan) <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Executive Council (Tanfidziah) <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Wakil Cabang<br />
------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
Village <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Religious Council (Syuriah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Pengurus<br />
(Desa/Kelurahan) <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Executive Council (Tanfidziah)<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Ranting<br />
========================================================================<br />
Source: Nahdlatul Ulama[1979a: 17-18]<br />
<br />
The principle of collegial solidarity among the ulama is<br />
reflected in the ways by which the relationships among various<br />
levels of the religious councils are regulated. A decision taken by<br />
the religious council of a higher level in the NU organisation<br />
does not automatically bind lower-level religious councils or<br />
individual ulama. In order to be effective, the decision must be<br />
persuasive and accepted voluntarily and wholeheartedly.<br />
Otherwise, lower-level religious councils and individual ulama<br />
may exercise the right to reserve their decision or the right to<br />
disagree and request further discussion, for there are no human<br />
beings, including the most learned and revered ulama, who can<br />
assume the position of ultimate authority on truth: that position<br />
is reserved only for God.<br />
In this organisational structure it may also happen that an<br />
ulama of a local religious council is much higher in authority and<br />
prestige than a 'lay-activist' member of the Central Executive<br />
Council. In this case the latter must pay due respect to what the<br />
local ulama has to say and accommodate this properly in the<br />
organisational action.<br />
The situation described above might look like a lack of<br />
discipline or an organisation infested by factionalism. Indeed, to<br />
the secular observer, the internal politics of the NU often appear<br />
to he hopelessly disorganised and perennially ridden by factional<br />
strife. However, when viewed in reference to the religious values<br />
underlying the organisational structure of the NU, apparent<br />
disagreements within the organisation present themselves not so<br />
much as a pathological state but rather as a healthy state of the<br />
organisation. With regard to this point, the ulama themselves<br />
often quote a hadith, a record of the Prophet's sayings, that<br />
disagreement among the ulama is the blessing of God for<br />
mankind. This being the case, therefore, when a consensus is<br />
reached on a particular issue among the ulama its morally<br />
binding force among the ulama, as well as over the community<br />
of the faithful, is extremely strong.17<br />
<br />
The Significance of the Reports of the Central Executive Council<br />
<br />
In the light of the basic organisation of the Nahdlatul Ulama<br />
described above, it seems possible now to appreciate better the<br />
significance of the major thrust of the reports delivered by<br />
Idham Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu. Both acknowledged that there<br />
had been many attempts to alter the fundamental character of<br />
the Nahdlatul Ulama. However, it had withstood these threats<br />
and dangers, and succeeded in adhering to its original character,<br />
the Islamic association of the Sunni tradition. That seemed to be<br />
the reason why Idham Chalid, as mentioned above, thanked God<br />
for the successful survival of the NU and implied that the<br />
direction which the NU had taken since its last congress was<br />
basically correct.18<br />
<br />
'Central' vs. 'Local' in the Nahdlatul Ulama<br />
<br />
From the preceding analysis of the structural features of the<br />
NU organisation, it should also be clear by now that the<br />
locational centrality of the Executive Council situated in Jakarta<br />
does not necessarily mean that it has more power and higher<br />
authority vis-a-vis local branches in the social geography of the<br />
Nahdlatul Ulama. Since the domiciles of nationally renowned<br />
ulama have been mostly in the pesantren of rural areas, often<br />
located deliberately remote from urban centres, it is a matter of<br />
natural order that 'local' usually connotes a higher place of<br />
esteem and authority than 'central' in the NU circles.19<br />
The militancy of the local delegates displayed in the NU<br />
congress, 'therefore, should not be taken as a 'rebellion of the<br />
local rank and file against the Central Executive Council.' That<br />
might be an appropriate picture for a modern bureaucratic<br />
organization in which the principles of centrality and hierarchy<br />
coincide, but not for the NU, with an organization based upon<br />
the collegial solidarity of autonomous llama. The claim of a<br />
local delegate, which I mentioned in the previous section, that<br />
the existence of the Central Executive Council depended largely<br />
on the local branches but not vice versa, is not mere rhetoric but<br />
rather an accurate presentation of the structural features of the<br />
NU organization. Thus, beneath the surface phenomenon of the<br />
militancy of local delegates which I observed in the congress,<br />
there seems to be the fundamental autonomy of the local<br />
branches of the NU under the leadership of the llama.<br />
<br />
Idham Chalid vs. Achmad Sjaichu<br />
<br />
This fundamental autonomy of the ulama and the<br />
concomitant militancy of the local branches in the NU<br />
organisation vis-a-vis its Central Executive Council seems to<br />
have played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of an<br />
electoral contest between the two Council members. Idham<br />
Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu. I must admit that my interpretation<br />
of the proceedings is almost entirely based upon my own<br />
observation of the overt events and actions on the floor of the<br />
congress. I must, therefore, have missed many events and actions<br />
concerning the electoral contest taking place behind the scenes.<br />
However, so far as observed facts are concerned, it seems that<br />
the difference in the two leaders' response to the criticisms from<br />
the local delegates determined the outcome of the election.<br />
My impression is that Idham Chalid's total surrender to the<br />
criticisms of the local delegates was seen by many of them as his<br />
acknowledgment of the distinguishing feature of the NU<br />
organisation, the sovereignty of the local branches and the<br />
ultimate autonomy of the ulama. Furthermore, it seems that<br />
many delegates felt it to be religiously commendable to forgive a<br />
man and give him another chance when he had honestly<br />
admitted and apologised for his mistakes, especially when the<br />
man is of obvious high calibre like Idham Chalid.<br />
In contrast, Achmad Sjaichu's self-defence, technically<br />
flawless and well argued if he had been a secular politician,<br />
sounded in fact tremendously arrogant, showing disrespect<br />
towards the local ulama and lack of appreciation of the primary<br />
role the local branches played in the NU organisation. It is my<br />
impression that Idham Chalid appeared to speak as a<br />
representative of the central service functionaries, while Achmad<br />
Sjaichu spoke as a representative of the central power holders.<br />
Idham Chalid affirmed the traditional ethos of the NU by<br />
expressing due respect towards the local ulama whereas Achmad<br />
Sjaichu defied the tradition and attempted to raise himself to the<br />
position of a supreme commander.20<br />
More generally, it can be observed that the fame of a leader in<br />
secular politics does not necessarily entail respect or trust in the<br />
NU circles. Rather, as indicated by the statement of the West<br />
Sumatran delegate quoted in the previous section equating<br />
politicians with 'rats', there seems to be a genuine distrust of<br />
secular politicians in the NU. An NU leader must, therefore,<br />
prove his leadership qualities primarily in religious terms whether<br />
he is sitting in the Religious or Executive Council.<br />
<br />
The Radical Traditionalism of the NU<br />
<br />
Let me conclude this section by discussing what I have called<br />
the radical traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama. First of all, it<br />
is my observation that the NU is organisationally radical in the<br />
original sense of the term, i.e., 'of or pertaining to a root or to<br />
roots; fundamental, primary' (Webster). As we have seen above,<br />
the NU organisation is structured on the basis of the principle of<br />
autonomy and independence of its primary component units, the<br />
ulama. The NU is not derivative of any other organisations. It<br />
stands on its own terms. Watak mandiri, the character of<br />
autonomy and independence, which constitutes the ethos of the<br />
pesantren, according to Abdurrahman Wahid, seems to run<br />
through the organisation of the Nahdlatul Ulama as well.21<br />
Secondly, there seems no denying that the NU has displayed<br />
an increasingly radical stance in politics in recent years: radical<br />
in the sense of broad, open, fundamental criticisms of the status<br />
quo. This recent radicalisation of the NU makes a stark contrast<br />
to its 'opportunistic' past. Has the NU changed its nature? It<br />
seems not. Rather, the basic religious nature of the NU remains<br />
constant. What has changed is its expression in the field of<br />
politics in response to national political developments. What<br />
concerns the NU all the time is whether it is striving to follow<br />
the Syari'ah, i.e., the Way of God or the religiously righteous<br />
way of life, as a group of individuals and as a collectivity of the<br />
community of the faithful, the umat.<br />
In pursuing this goal, the NU works directly from within the<br />
umat. The NU is committed to the well-being of the community<br />
of the faithful, and seeks divine guidance in the Qur'an and the<br />
Sunna, as they are interpreted by the ulama, in order to find<br />
appropriate ways for the faithful to behave in response to<br />
changing external situations. In so doing, the ulama know no other<br />
authorities than God Himself. The ulama cannot be<br />
dictated to by the temporal political authorities. The ulama are<br />
independent of the 'establishment', sometimes to the extent of<br />
open defiance. This gives a feature of fundamental 'people-ness'<br />
(kerakyatan), a sort of populism, to the NU. If the NU sees an<br />
external situation moving in the same direction as it is heading,<br />
it will take an adaptive or 'opportunistic' stance vis-a-vis the<br />
external situation. Equally, if it sees the external environment<br />
moving in a direction contrary to its own, it will become<br />
radically critical of the external environment. The NU's stance<br />
can thus be situationally selective. At present, it is undoubtedly<br />
entering a radical phase. Yet, in both phases, the religious ideal,<br />
the Syari'ah, remains fundamental for the NU.22<br />
Thirdly, the NU is traditional in one vital area of religious<br />
life, the transmission of religious values through scholarship and<br />
education. It is traditional in the true sense of the word, i.e.,<br />
'adhering to the act of transmitting something from generation<br />
to generation' (Webster). This characteristic of the NU is self-<br />
evident and does not seem to require any further elaboration.23<br />
One point, however, to be remarked upon here is the fact that<br />
the NU's traditionalism in the area of religious scholarship and<br />
education does not necessarily mean that the content of what is<br />
being learned and transmitted is traditional in the sense of being<br />
mere blind repetition of past things. Instead, what is learned and<br />
transmitted is an ideal system to which individuals must adapt<br />
themselves and after which social reality must be remoulded. The<br />
mode of transmission may be traditional but what is transmitted<br />
is radical. I believe that this is one of the reasons why the NU's<br />
religious traditionalism does not hinder but rather enhances its<br />
<br />
<br />
******<br />
<br />
* This article was originally published in Southeast Asian Studies<br />
(Tonan Ajia Kenkyu), vol. 19, no. 2, September 1981, pp. 187-204, and<br />
is reprinted here with the kind permission of the publishers.<br />
<br />
1 The spelling of the name of Nahdlatul Ulama in this paper follows the<br />
one employed by the organisation itself. Also in this paper, a distinction made in the Arabic original between 'alim (singular) and ulama (plural)--meaning 'man of knowledge'--has been ignored, following the Indonesian convention. In other words ulama is used both for singular and plural.<br />
<br />
2 The NU was established in 1926 as jam'iyah diniyah Islamiyah, or<br />
'Islamic religious association, and its fundamental character has not<br />
changed since. However, from the viewpoint of its relationship with<br />
government and politics, the history of the NU can be divided into five periods as follows: (a) 1926-1942, when the NU maintained a strict non-political and non-cooperative stance vis-a-vis the Dutch colonial government; (b) 1942-1945, when it was forced to cooperate with the Japanese occupation authorities; (c) 1945-1952, when it participated in the newly established Republican government through the Masyumi party, in which it held the status of a special member; (d) 1952-1973, when it participated in government and politics directly and independently in its own name, i.e., the NU as a political party; and (e)1973-present, when it relinquished its political activities to the newly formed Development Unity Party, or Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), and re-conformed its fundamental character as jam'iyah diniyah, religious association. The most recent change has been described by one of the NU leaders as the act of 'releasing' (melepaskan) and 'bestowing abundantly' (melimpahkan, limpah denotes overflowing of some liquid from a container) the 'practical political activities (aktivitas politik praktis) of the NU to the PPP [Achmad Siddiq 1979: 7]. These expressions seem to illustrate aptly the change as viewed by the NU leadership. <br />
<br />
3 Nakamura [1972] gives an overview of the scope of this field work. For a history of social and religious developments in the town from the turn of the century up to the early 1970s, with a particular focus on the growth of the Muhammadiyah, see Nakamura [1976;1977].<br />
<br />
4 This picture of the NU, first presented and developed by Harry Benda<br />
and Clifford Geertz in the 1950s [Benda 1958; Geertz 1960a; 1960b],<br />
was unchallenged for the next two decades and even elaborated into a<br />
particular type in the political constellation of modern Indonesia by<br />
Feith and Castles [1970].<br />
<br />
5 The earliest documentation of this phenomenon seems to have been made<br />
by Ken Ward when he observed the 1971 general elections in East Java<br />
[Ward 1974]. On the basis of Ward's report and also of his own earlier work [Anderson 1970] in which the pondok-pesantren, the traditional rural Islamic boarding school, was viewed as the generator of revolutionary youths for the Indonesian independence struggle of 1945-1949, Ben Anderson warns of prejudice often found in the conventional secular view of the Nahdlatul Ulama as 'politically opportunist' [Anderson 1977: 23-24]. For descriptions of the struggles of the NU and the PPP in and around the 1971 and 1977 elections, see Liddle [1978], May [1978], and McDonald [1980].<br />
<br />
6 Various parts of the 'Basic Program for the Development of the<br />
Nahdlatul Ulama, 1979-1983' adopted by this NU congress in<br />
Semarang attest to this [Nahdlatul Ulama 1979b]. A more politically<br />
explicit criticism of the government can be found in the statement of the Development Unity Party presented to the MPR (Majelis<br />
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative Assembly) on<br />
March ] 5, 1978, by one of its leaders, H. A. Chalid Mawardi, who is also a member of the current Central Executive Council of the Nahdlatul ulama. Criticising the presidential speech on the government's performance, 1973-1977, Chalid Mawardi advocated the following six points: (1) change the economic structure from one which is colonial and dependent on international markets into one that is more independent and based on self-reliance; (2) change dependence of the economy on imported capital, technology, and management to reliance on domestic human resources; (3) first priorities should be given to the basic needs of good, clothing, housing, education, and health; (4) the bottom 40% of the population must receive special attention; (5) a nation-wide full employment policy is needed; and (6) inequalities in the distribution of property ownership, trade facilities, and the availability of education must be reduced (See McDonald [1980: 247-2491).<br />
<br />
7 The most articulate spokesmen for this category of young activists<br />
include Abdurrahman Wahid and Mahbub Djunaidi. The former was<br />
elected to the position of vice-secretary of the Central Religious<br />
Council, Syuriah, and the latter, to that of second chairman of the Central executive Council, Tanfidziah, of the Nahdlatul Ulama through the Semarang congress. Both are popular and frequent contributors to a number of newspapers and magazines, including the most widely<br />
circulated, Kompas and Tempo. Their recent writings are now<br />
conveniently compiled into booklets, Abdurrahman Wahid [1979] and<br />
Mahbub Djunaidi [1978] respectively. Wawasan, a journal for<br />
intellectual discussion in search of alternative development strategies (published by the Lembaga Studi Pembangunan (LSP), Institute of Development Studies, Jakarta), should be given particular attention for the fact that its initial chief editor was Abdurrahman Wahid. Of course, the search for alternative development models is not confined to the NU circles. A number of young intellectuals and social activists are emerging and cooperating with each other regardless of their diverse ideological backgrounds and formal organisational affiliations. LSP is only one example of such cooperation. The popular social science journal Prisma also provides a common forum for these people. For earlier attempts by a group of young Islamic intellectuals at re-evaluating the pesantren for its potentiality in rural community development, see Dawan Rahardjo [1947a; 1974b; 1975] and Sudjoko Prasodjo et al. [1974].<br />
<br />
8 As far as I know, the best, though brief, exegesis of the NU tradition written for its own members is found in Achmad Siddiq [1979], an NU leader of national fame living in Jember, East Java. An 'autobiographic novel' written by Saifuddin Zuhri [1977], an NU leader from Banyumas, Central Java, and former Minister of Religion, depicts vividly the world of rural kiai and ulama and the development of the Nahdlatul Ulama from the 1930s through the post-independence period. An invaluable semi-official source book for the history of the NU is the commemorative volume dedicated to the late Wahid Hasjim, the NU leader from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, edited by Haji Aboebakar [1957]. For historical and ethnographic accounts in English of the intellectual and social organisational aspects of the pesantren tradition, see Zamakhsyari [1980; 1981].<br />
<br />
9 The congress was held in the Sports Hall of the Province of Central Java (GOR, Gedung Olah Raga Propinsi Jawa Tengah) in the city of<br />
Semarang, gathering together about 4,500 delegates from 343 branches of the Nahdlatul Ulama in all provinces of Indonesia (except Timor Timur). The delegates were accommodated in numerous middle to low class hotels and lodging houses (losmen) in the city, from where they were transported to GOR every day by a large number of micro-buses hired by the congress Organising Committee. A common kitchen (dapur umum) was set up, under a huge tent raised next to the GOR building, to serve meals to the delegates three times a day.<br />
<br />
10 The agenda of the NU congress was as follows: (a) first day: registration and provincial meetings; (b) second day: plenary sessions for the opening ceremony and the reports of the Central Executive Council; (c)third and fourth days: plenary sessions for the speeches of the local delegates and the replies from the Central Executive Council; (d) fifth and sixth days: commissions and committee meetings; (e) seventh day: plenary sessions for the adoption of resolutions and statements, the election of new leadership, and closing ceremony. The scope of the debates in the NU congress can be appreciated by looking at the discussion material prepared for the participants in the congress, Rancangan Materi Muktamar N.U. Ke-XXVI [Nahdlatul Ulama 1979a], which contained 'The Rules for the Order of the Congress (Peraturan Tata Tertib Muktamar),''Draft Constitution of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Rancangan Anggaran Dasar Nahdlatul Ulama).''Basic Program for the Development of the Nahdlatul Ulama, 1979-1983 (Program Dasar Pengembangan Nahdlatul Ulama. 1979-1983).''Draft Resolutions and Statements to be adopted by the 26th Congress of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Rancangan Pernyataan/Sikap Nahdlatul Ulama yang diputuskan Muktamar N. U. Ke- XXVI.)' and some other items. The official version of the 'Basic Program...,' amended and adopted by the congress, is now available separately [Nahdlatul Ulama 1979b].<br />
<br />
11 Of the Indonesian mass media which covered this NU congress in<br />
Semarang, Suara Merdeka, a local daily of Semarang, and Tempo, a<br />
weekly magazine in Jakarta, seem to have produced the most detailed<br />
reportage of the congress. Other newspapers in Jakarta, such as Kompas, Sinar Harapan, and Islamic Pelita, and nationalist Merdeka, also devoted many articles to it. For the official report oft congress by the Nahdlatul Ulama itself, see its organ Risalah Nahdlatul Ulama.<br />
<br />
12 The reader should, therefore, be warned of the limitations of this paper. It only deals with one aspect of the congress, which certainly had many other aspects not reported in this paper. Furthermore, I must make it clear that I still lack first-hand information on the NU in local social contexts, an aspect which has to be studied in any serious attempt at understanding the NU at its grass-roots. A full- scale research of the NU is yet to be done.<br />
<br />
13 The report by Idham Chalid is available in mimeograph, Pidato Ketua<br />
Umum PB Nahdlatul Ulama KH Dr. Idham Chalid pada Muktamar NU<br />
Ke-XYVI di Semarang. For the Report by Achmad Sjaichu, no printed<br />
version was distributed and I have relied on my own field notes.<br />
<br />
14 Although the delegates from East, West, and Central Java were by far the most numerous, one feature of this congress which surprised me was that the NU branches are now well spread throughout all parts of the country. They are no longer confined to the islands of Java and Madura, the traditional bases of the NU. A large number of delegates came to this NU congress from Aceh, North, South and West Sumatra, South Kalimantan, South and Central Sulawesi, and Eastern Indonesia. The conventional view still held by many Western observers that there is an inherent affinity between the NU and certain cultural traits of the Javanese, Madurese, and Sundanese seems now to require critical re-examination.<br />
<br />
15 As one of the criteria for assessing the qualifications of a pesantren for the scholarship program, Achmad Sjaichu mentions the level of teaching in Arabic. Certainly the command of Arabic seems to be a basic prerequisite for a student to be considered eligible for advanced study in the institutions of higher learning in the Middle East; and the local delegates agreed with that. However, many of them seem to have been disturbed by the arbitrariness of the way in which a student's level of competence in Arabic was equated with the size of the fame of the pesantren to which the student belonged. Many delegates obviously wanted to have a more open competition and to give equal chances and encouragement to all students aspiring to study in the Middle East.<br />
<br />
16 The reports by the Central Executive Council were finally accepted by the floor with a 'footnote' (catatan kaki) by the chairman of the plenary session who stated that the reports themselves were far from perfect; that all criticisms and suggestions for improvements should be added to the reports; and that the new leadership should heed the criticisms presented by the local delegates. With this critical 'footnote', the reports were approved by voice vote.<br />
<br />
17 I attended a session of the Syuriah meeting held during the congress in the huge prayer hall of the Baiturrahman Mosque, next to the GOR<br />
building. The meeting was carried on in a serious but informal manner. There was no furniture at all except for one simple low desk in front of the chairman and the secretary, around whom the participants sat directly on the carpeted floor in irregular concentric circles. There was no seating order except that the Central Syuriah members and local Syuriah delegates occupied the inner rings while ordinary delegates, observers and onlookers like myself sat in the outer rings. The chairman seemed to be making a conscious effort to canvass and exhaust different views among the participant ulama on the subject under discussion. Debate went on endlessly around some issues. It sounded as if, on average, one-<br />
third of the oral presentation by a speaker was made in Arabic,<br />
apparently direct quotations from the Qur'an, the Hadith or a<br />
commentary, without being translated into Indonesian. Since I do not<br />
have a command of Arabic, I was not quite certain of what exactly was<br />
being discussed in the session. But it seemed to me that the meeting was, more often than not, agreeing to disagree over a number of issues and then deciding how to deal with the disagreements. Certainly there were a number of renowned and revered senior ulama in this Syuriah session as well as in other meetings of the congress I observed. However, their seniority or 'charisma' did not at all stifle free and lively discussions. The absolute obedience of the santri (student) to the kiai (teacher), supposedly an ethos of the pesantren, did not seem to apply to the debate in the Syuriah or in any other meetings of the NU congress. A statement made by Idham Chalid in the beginning of his report that 'the NU had been pursuing its goals without being dictated to by anyone (tanpa dikomando), internally or externally' sounded truthful to me. In observing the sessions of the NU congress, I was sometimes irritated by an excess democracy rather than by any lack of it. The NU's way of deliberation brought home to me the true meaning of musyawarah mufakat (deliberation for consensus), which is often mistaken as compromise for convenience.<br />
<br />
18 I did not hear a single objection to the direction being taken since the Surabaya congress, that is the relinquishing of political activities to the PPP and the reaffirmation of the NU's status as a religious association. The suggestion of the Vice President of the Republic, Adam Malik, made in his opening address to the congress, that 'the NU people do not need to be non-political (tidak usah perlu tidak ber-politik),' was light-heartedly appreciated but did not become a focus of serious discussion. Besides Adam Malik, a number of generals and government dignitaries came to address the congress. The response from the floor was generally polite and cordial, but sometimes refreshingly open.<br />
<br />
19 Ken Ward [1974: 94-95] and Ben Anderson [1977: 24] discuss this<br />
phenomenon from a slightly different angle than mine.<br />
<br />
20 A common image of Achmad Sjaichu outside the NU circles is that he is<br />
more 'modern', 'progressive' and closer to the 'reformists' like the<br />
Muhammadiyah than to the mainstream of the NU, and that he has strong<br />
ties with the international Muslim world, especially with the Middle<br />
Eastern countries. My observation of his performance in the congress<br />
leads me to question the appropriateness of this characterisation.<br />
<br />
21 On the concept of watak mandiri, see the important paper entitled,<br />
Pesantren dan pengembangan watak mandiri (Pesantren and the<br />
development of the character of autonomy), presented by Abdurrahman<br />
Wahid to the Second National Congress of the Indonesian Association<br />
for the Advancement of the Social Sciences (HIPIIS) held in Menado,<br />
North Sulawesi, November 1977 (now included in Abdurrahman Wahid<br />
[1979)).<br />
<br />
22 It seems necessary to take a fresh look at the history of the NU from the viewpoint of the NU's self-perception. For this, another recent work of Saifuddin Zuhri may provide a useful framework [Saifuddin Zuhri 1979].<br />
<br />
23 Since my knowledge of traditional Islamic scholarship is very limited, I am incapable of appreciating whether there are any new developments which might challenge this tradition from within the NU circles. Even if there are any, my feeling is that they are more likely to be advanced in the name of tradition rather than in the name of reform. See Zamakhsyari [1981] on this matter.<br />
<br />Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-13455746051390288922015-03-28T15:30:00.000+07:002015-03-28T15:30:01.760+07:00Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia. Next 1<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
idea of obligation without, however, setting out precisely how it<br />
would be enforced. The Ministry of Religious Affairs gave<br />
assurances that the Charter would not harm non-Muslims, but<br />
there was no answer to those Muslims whose practice and<br />
knowledge of Islam was minimal.58<br />
As NU controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs, NU<br />
would, of course, be a determining factor in the debate. The<br />
minister, KH M. Dachlan, made a declaration that the Charter<br />
was indeed 'a source of law', a declaration used by modernist<br />
Islam to strengthen support for the Charter. Later, in August,<br />
Dachlan called those who 'betrayed' the Charter 'hypocrites'.<br />
As early as June 1968, the government had reacted by asking<br />
civil servants not to attend Jakarta Charter commemoration<br />
ceremonies. A PMPI celebration was also refused authorisation<br />
by the army.59 The Catholic youth group, Angkatan Muda<br />
Katolik, sent a memorandum to President Suharto rejecting a<br />
ministerial decision that described one of the tasks of the<br />
Ministry of Religious Affairs as 'applying the Jakarta Charter in<br />
its relationship with the Constitution'. 60 It suggested that the<br />
Ministry be disbanded altogether.<br />
It was only under government pressure that the debate<br />
subsided. As the aformentioned political parties' commission had<br />
not succeeded in elaborating a common definition of the<br />
Charter, the army urged them to stop their efforts, arguing that<br />
tensions would be exacerbated at a moment when the New<br />
Order's stability was still fragile.61 Ibrahim Hosen, a law<br />
specialist, was quoted in a widely read Muslim magazine as saying<br />
that the Charter was 'a necessity for law uniformisation, but did<br />
not constitute an effort to enforce the application of the<br />
Syari'ah'.62 I have found few declarations indicating exactly<br />
what NU understood to be implied in the Jakarta Charter. KH<br />
Dachlan said the Charter would allow government intervention<br />
to ensure that the zakat and Muslim marriage customs be<br />
respected.63 This gives a rather limited scope to the Charter, not<br />
interfering with religious practices or the law in general. NU<br />
never officially stated its understanding of the Charter, and most<br />
texts on it quoted by Duta Masyarakat were from non-NU or<br />
joint organisations' circles. Given the diversity of thought within<br />
NU, there is reason to believe that there would, in fact, have<br />
been no agreement on the scope of the Charter.<br />
There was never any official ban of the Jakarta Charter but<br />
from then on, any contentious reference to it was avoided. This<br />
is not to say that the Suharto government was opposed to<br />
Islamic concerns. On the contrary, it accepted such<br />
arrangements as the one that saw zakat being imposed on civil<br />
servants, collected by a foundation, Yayasan Amal Bakti<br />
Muslimin Pancasila, but not formalised in law. There were other<br />
sore points, including the suppression of substantial subsidies for<br />
the hajj. NU also disapproved of the government's laxity toward<br />
prostitution, pornography and gambling. It was most of all<br />
worried at new inroads apparently made by Christianity in<br />
Sumatra and Java in the early years of the New Order-one of<br />
the consequences of the 1966 MPRS decision to make religious<br />
education compulsory and to ban atheism.64<br />
Thus, it is clear that the two 'brothers'-NU and the army-<br />
had developed into awkward partners. Despite army resistance,<br />
some ulama wanted the Jakarta Charter recognised while NU<br />
politicians wanted a greater degree of democracy which they<br />
believed would bring about a larger representation for NU in<br />
Parliament. But NU was in a difficult position: representing the<br />
government through the Minister of Religious Affairs, it had to<br />
go against its own values and interests and protect all five<br />
officially recognised faiths. It also had to defend the suppression<br />
of subsidies for the hajj, and appeal for tolerance. Such appeals<br />
were controversial at a time when Muslims were resentful of<br />
what they saw as unprecedented competition from Christians.<br />
Kiai Dachlan's speeches reveal how he oscillated from a<br />
compromising stance to a fierce defence of Islam. In a speech in<br />
May 1968, he repeated Suharto's recent statement that there<br />
was 'neither majority nor minority in religion, and there was<br />
'neither legitimate nor illegitimate children', clearly protecting<br />
the minority religions.65 But in January 1969, Dachlan went as<br />
far as declaring that: 'If the faithful of other religions attack the<br />
Muslims and soil its purity, then the Muslim community has to<br />
face this challenge with the same approach in obedience to<br />
Allah, and if necessary, has to take arms to preserve the purity<br />
of its religion." He made this statement at a time when several<br />
incidents had recently occurred between the Muslim and<br />
Christian communities in 1967 and 1968.67<br />
The final stage of open conflict between the army and NU<br />
was the legislative elections which took place in 1971. The<br />
army-backed Golkar, now competing as a political party, had<br />
succeeded in attracting a few ulama, some of whom were so<br />
ostracised later that they were almost banished from their<br />
communities.68 Among those who crossed over were members of<br />
the great NU families from Jombang, East Java, like KH A.<br />
Karim Hasyim, one of the sons of Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari. It is not<br />
my purpose here to describe Golkar's inroads into the Islamic<br />
organisation, but it is important to note that those within NU<br />
who did not yet see the army as rivals were soon convinced of it<br />
during the election campaign when intimidation became<br />
commonplace. Subchan warned that NU had 'abandoned its<br />
sarong in order to be able to run faster than Golkar'.69 Ken Ward<br />
has rightly pointed to the fact that Golkar's expansion and its<br />
methods had forced NU to play a role it always had avoided: the<br />
role of an opposition.70 As we have seen, this role can be traced<br />
back as early as 1966.<br />
NU's attitude of accommodation toward the communist-<br />
friendly Old Order had turned into a new opposition against the<br />
army-dominated New Order. Subchan had been a prominent<br />
figure during both periods. But here again, there was a<br />
conservative current. Idham Chalid appealed to NU sympathisers<br />
to 'increase participation and cooperation with government<br />
agencies' and to make the elections 'a success', a formula<br />
implying relative support for the new regime.71 In the face of<br />
contradictory statements coming from NU, Kiai Masykur had to<br />
intervene to dispell suggestions of confrontation within the<br />
organisation. According to him, Idham Chalid and Subchan were<br />
only 'managing two different fields'.72<br />
With 18.67% of the total vote in 1971, NU performed well<br />
(improving on 18.4% of the vote gained in 1955), but it did<br />
poorly compared to Golkar's 62.8%. It felt distressed by the<br />
results. Indeed, there had been predictions within NU that<br />
political parties would gather as much as 85% of the votes and<br />
that Golkar would come third after NU and the PNI. The<br />
disappointments did not stop, however, with the 1971 election<br />
results. The next blow came when the Ministry of Religious<br />
Affairs was removed from NU's control. The new minister was<br />
Mukti Ali, a professor of comparative theology and a modernist<br />
Muslim with no particular ties to any established organisation.<br />
The government expected that he would put an end to the<br />
Ministry of Religious Affairs being seen as 'a state within the<br />
state', something frequently asserted by its critics. In 1971, the<br />
Ministry Religious Affairs had refused to apply new legislation<br />
regarding monoloyalitas or the 'moral obligation' for civil<br />
servants to join and vote for Golkar.<br />
A consequence of 1971's manifold disappointments was the<br />
expansion of an anti-Subchan current within NU. This current<br />
was strengthened by the ill fortune of the revived Masyumi,<br />
Partai Muslimin Indonesia. It was subject to tight government<br />
control and interference, a disconcerting development for NU<br />
which had been unaccustomed to government intervention in its<br />
internal affairs.73 In January 1972, after the death of Kiai<br />
Wahab Chasbullah, Subchan was dismissed from NU's executive<br />
board. Many observers have seen in this dismissal the hand of<br />
the army manipulating power conflicts within NU. But the<br />
official letter announcing Subchan's resignation would seem to<br />
indicate that this decision was due largely to traditional Sunni<br />
anti-radicalist sentiment. One reason mentioned is that NU<br />
wanted to choose 'the way of the middle', away 'from extremes<br />
and away from western or oriental political practices'.74<br />
Abdurrahman Wahid, grandson of NU's founder Hasjim Asj'ari<br />
and of Kiai Bisri Syansuri (who was made the new rais am after<br />
the death of Kiai Wahab), was quoted at that time explaining<br />
Subchan's dismissal in the following terms: 'Pressures will be<br />
stronger from the government against NU, the effect of which<br />
will be to isolate NU from the mainstream, the main current of<br />
Indonesian politiCs'.75 This sentence has a prophetic ring today<br />
when one knows how NU activities suffered from the<br />
authorities' distrust during the 1970s.76<br />
It is essential to note that the Sunni tradition of government<br />
legitimation was not the only current of political thought<br />
evident in the 1971 context. Subchan was defended by major<br />
ulama such as Kiai Ali Ma'sum of Krapyak, Kiai As'ad Syamsul<br />
Arifin of Situbondo, and by many regional branches, who had put<br />
their hope in this dynamic, educated and cosmopolitan<br />
politician. With the dismissal of Subchan and then his accidental<br />
death in Mecca in 1973, NU moved closer to the mainstream,<br />
but remained for more than ten years the army's main critic in<br />
Parliament. Pushed by sharpened rivalry with the army, NU<br />
could not relent in its battle despite the Sunni tradition of<br />
moderation.<br />
In conclusion, we can see that NU was not a monolithic<br />
organisation in the early New Order period, but rather an<br />
association of ulama and individuals with greatly differing<br />
backgrounds and widely divergent interests. This resulted in<br />
constant debates among the small circle of people controlling<br />
the party, who disagreed over how far NU should go in defending<br />
its interests without risking a political backlash. The Lubis<br />
resolution in February 1967 committed NU to Suharto's cause<br />
despite a hesitant leadership, and Subchan was dismissed in 1972<br />
in a kind of peace pact with the army, regardless of strong<br />
support for his radicalism even among the ulama. Some NU<br />
leaders nowadays speculate that NU would have fared better if<br />
the radical current led by Subchan had been less influential. But<br />
Subchan was merely articulating a current of dissatisfaction,<br />
whose sources were numerous: while the army was increasingly<br />
dominating the political institutions, the more religious members<br />
were themselves uneasy at the way in which the Jakarta Charter<br />
was pushed aside, this unease was also exacerbated by the<br />
phenomena of widespread conversions to Christianity. In any<br />
case, the major changes taking place in the post-Sukarno period<br />
could hardly have occurred without a significant degree of pain.<br />
Subchan's influence increased as the dissatisfaction grew, but was<br />
held in check by the traditional Sunni concern with avoiding<br />
chaos at any price. Despite the 'peace pact', the relationship<br />
with the army remained at best uneasy in the 1970s.<br />
This awkward relationship improved somewhat after 1984<br />
when NU decided to 'withdraw from politics', that is to stop<br />
giving its exclusive support to the Partai Persatuan<br />
Pembangunan, the sole Muslim political party into which all<br />
Muslim parties had to merge in 1973. From then on, under the<br />
umbrella of the armed forces and the government, the<br />
movement started to prosper again, enjoying more facilities for<br />
what mattered most for the ulama: to preserve Islam through<br />
preaching and education.77<br />
<br />
References<br />
<br />
Anam, Choirul 1985, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul<br />
Ulama, Jatayu Sala, Solo.<br />
<br />
Boland, B. J. 1971, The Struggle of lslam in Modern Indonesia,<br />
Verhandlingen van het Koningklik Vorr Taal-, Land- en<br />
Volkenkunde, The Hague.<br />
<br />
Cribb, R. (ed.) 1990, The Indonesian Killings: Studies from Java<br />
and Pall, 1965-1966, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia,<br />
No.21, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash<br />
University, Melbourne.<br />
<br />
Crouch, H. 1978, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell<br />
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.<br />
<br />
Feillard A. 1993, 'Les Oulemas Indonesians Aujourd'hui: De<br />
I'Opposition 9 Une Nouvelle Legitimite', Archipel, no.46,<br />
pp.89-110.<br />
<br />
Feith, H. 1968, 'Suharto's Search for a Political Format',<br />
Indonesia, Ithaca, pp.88-105.<br />
<br />
Grunebaum, G.E. von 1962, L 'Islam medieval, Editions Payot,<br />
Paris.<br />
<br />
Jones, S. 1984,'The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat"<br />
and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia',<br />
Indonesia, no.38, pp.1-20.<br />
<br />
Hughes, J. 1967, The End of Sukarno: A Coup that misfired, a<br />
Purge that Ran Wild, Angus and Robertson, London.<br />
<br />
Nasution, A.H. 1989, Memenuhi panggilan tugas: masa pemancangan<br />
Orde Pembangunan, jilid 8, Masagung, Jakarta.<br />
<br />
Nugroho, N. 1985, Tercapainya Konsensus Nasional 1966-<br />
1969, PN Balai Pustaka, Jakarta.<br />
<br />
Sjaichu, A. 1991, Kembali ke Pesantren: Kenangan 70 tahun<br />
KH Achmad Sjaichu, Yayasan Islam al Hamidiyah, Jakarta.<br />
<br />
Walkin, J. 1969,'The Moslem-Communist Confrontation in<br />
East Java 1964-1965', Orbis, pp.822-847.<br />
<br />
Ward, K. 1971, 'The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin<br />
Indonesia', Indonesia, pp.37-47.<br />
---1974, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case<br />
Study, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no.2, Monash<br />
University, Melbourne.<br />
<br />
Zuhri, S. 1987, Berangkat dari Pesantren, Gunung Agung,<br />
Jakarta.<br />
<br />
*******<br />
<br />
58 Duta Masyarakat, 24 June 1968.<br />
<br />
59 Nasution, jilid 8, 1989:105-106.<br />
<br />
60 Ward 1968:46.<br />
<br />
61 Interview with former intelligence chief, Sutopo Yuwono, 1991.<br />
<br />
62 Kiblat, 8, XVI, p.33.<br />
<br />
63 Kiblat, 3, XVI, 1968, p. 6.<br />
<br />
64 Boland 1971:231. The Assembly introduced compulsory religious<br />
education from primary school to university. The aim was to create<br />
purely 'Pancasilaist citizen' (manusia pantjasilais sedjati) (Decision TAP MPRS XXVII/1966, chapter I, article 1). Every Indonesian had to profess one of the five officially recognised religions: Islam, Catholicism Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism.<br />
<br />
65 Speech of 11 May 1968, published in Kiblat, 4, XVI, p. 32, 1968.<br />
<br />
66 'Pendjelasan Humas Departemen Agama mengenai Toleransi Agama',<br />
published in full in Duta Masyarakat, 3 March 1969.<br />
<br />
67 Clashes between Muslims and Christians took place in several<br />
Indonesian cities, including Makassar in October 1967 (following a<br />
Protestant clergyman's alleged criticism of Allah and polygamy) and in Banjak Island in 1968, where there was a massive exodus of Christians.<br />
<br />
68 See Jones 1984 on the subject.<br />
<br />
69 Analis, 20 June 1971.<br />
<br />
70 Refer to: Ward 1984:110.<br />
<br />
71 Angkatan Bersendjata, 18 June 1971.<br />
<br />
72 Duta Masyarakat, 23 June 1971.<br />
<br />
73 On this, see Ward 1970.<br />
<br />
74 'Pendjelasan tentang Keputusan P.B. Syuriah NU tentang Pembebasan<br />
JTH Sdr. H.M. Subchan Z.E. dari Kepengurusan PBNU' (Personal<br />
archive of Asnawi Latief).<br />
<br />
75 Kompas, 25 February 1972.<br />
<br />
76 On this, see my article in Archipel 46, Feillard 1993.<br />
<br />
77 I have shown how beneficial the 1984 decision had been in education<br />
and missionary activities in Feillard 1993.<br />
<br />Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-24955522123562060252015-03-22T07:30:00.000+07:002015-03-22T07:30:00.561+07:00Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia. Chapter Two<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
Chapter Two</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Traditionalist Islam and the</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Army in Indonesia's New</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Order: The Awkward</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Relationship</div>
<br />
Andree Feillard<br />
<br />
<br />
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest traditionalist<br />
Islamic organisation, played a legitimating role in the rise of<br />
President Suharto's New Order military-backed regime following<br />
the abortive coup of September 1965 (the coup which triggered<br />
the elimination of Indonesian communism). A unique<br />
phenomenon in the Muslim world, NU grew in importance from<br />
that time on, in large part because it was the only major political<br />
force, next to the army, which remained intact. The fact that it<br />
gained more than 18% of the vote in the 1955 and 1971 general<br />
elections further contributed to its political weight.<br />
NU was established in 1926 as an association of ulama and<br />
their followers in the pesantren (religious boarding school)<br />
milieu. It came steadily closer to the centre stage of Indonesian<br />
politics during the 1950s, despite its rural roots which often<br />
caused it to be slighted by the Jakarta elite, both secular<br />
nationalist and Islamic modernist. During the Second World<br />
War, the Japanese had made NU's president-general (rais am)<br />
head of the National Religious Affairs Office (Shumubu),1 and<br />
after independence, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was given<br />
to an NU leader (after initially being held by a modernist<br />
Muslim).<br />
The period of parliamentary democracy saw NU rise as a<br />
political party when it took the rather audacious step in 1952 of<br />
parting from the major Islamic political party, Masyumi, whose<br />
leadership was, according to NU leaders, too much dominated by<br />
modernists. In the first national elections in 1955, NU's<br />
political strength was demonstrated when it became the third<br />
largest party, after the PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia--The<br />
Nationalist Party of Indonesia) and Masyumi. The PKI (Partai<br />
Komunis Indonesia--the Communist Party of Indonesia) was the<br />
fourth-ranked party.<br />
Each of NU's three main competitors were swept aside over<br />
the next decade. In 1960 Masyumi was banned because of its ties<br />
with the 1958 PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik<br />
Indonesia--the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of<br />
Indonesia) rebellion in Sumatra. Following the 1965 coup the<br />
PM, being perceived to be too close to Sukarno, was severely<br />
weakened while the PKI was banned and its members either killed<br />
or incarcerated.<br />
Thus, of all the major political parties from the Sukarno era,<br />
NU was the only party of consequence left. As such, NU's<br />
response to developments in the period immediately after the<br />
coup was important in reshaping Indonesia's political system<br />
after Sukarno's 'guided democracy'. Ironically, as NU abetted<br />
the army's rise to power it simultaneously found itself<br />
increasingly sidelined in Indonesian politics. This drove some<br />
Within it to a new radicalism, away from the tradition of Sunni<br />
Pragmatism in politics, which has always been a distinctive<br />
feature of NU's political thinking.2<br />
I shall analyse the early relationship between the army and<br />
NU, and the many reasons for their later estrangement, looking<br />
beyond the general assumption that the military had neither the<br />
intention of sharing power nor the intention of letting ideologies<br />
and religions divide the country. I shall begin by retracing the<br />
role NU played in General Suharto's installation as president in<br />
1968. This history is important if one is to understand the<br />
reaction of deep disappointment that followed when<br />
traditionalist Islam was given a subordinate political role after<br />
the 1971 elections. Following this, I shall describe the mounting<br />
tension, both in the political and religious fields, between the two<br />
political groups, a tension that culminated in the violent 1971<br />
election campaign. This led to a long period of malaise which<br />
only came to an end in 1984, when NU decided to leave<br />
practical politics and allow its members to support the army-<br />
backed Golkar party. We shall see that the Sunni tradition of<br />
government legitimation, which determined NU's political<br />
strategy in 1966, and also in the 1987 elections, was not an<br />
uncontested approach, but had serious opponents even among<br />
the ulama.<br />
<br />
The Alliance with the Army<br />
<br />
NU's reaction to the events of 30 September 1965 was seen<br />
in the massive outbreak of anti-communist violence that<br />
followed the coup.3 There is strong evidence that in East Java,<br />
Ansor, the youth wing of NU, played an important part in the<br />
anti-communist killings of 1965-1966.4 When in December<br />
1965 the Team Peneliti Korban G30S PKI, an official fact-<br />
finding mission into the killings, reported back to Sukarno, the<br />
president is said to have strongly reprimanded the delegates of<br />
the team who were Ansor members, saying he was disgusted by<br />
Ansor's role in the slaughter.5 But NU's official political<br />
position was in fact due more to prudence than anything else.<br />
The fact that some senior NU leaders had a strong attachment<br />
to Sukarno made their position difficult. This resulted in the<br />
emergence of two distinct currents of thought, a radical, pro-<br />
army current and another one rather more ambivalent about its<br />
support for Suharto's new army-backed regime.<br />
<br />
NU's Role in the Rise of President Suharto<br />
<br />
On 1 October the first reaction of NU's senior leaders was to<br />
seek information about the kidnapping of the army's six top<br />
generals, who were later found to have been killed. Indeed, the<br />
mounting rivalry between the army and the PKI was clear to<br />
everyone, but the radio announcement by the coup leaders on<br />
October had not indicated any PKI involvement, saying<br />
instead that it was 'a movement within the army' aimed at<br />
Protecting Sukarno from an army plot sponsored by the CIA.6<br />
Suspicion of communist involvement was, however, high among<br />
the NU leadership.7 The decision was taken to have NU senior<br />
leaders go into hiding while a mandate was given to 34 year old<br />
Zainuri Echsan Subchan, NU's fourth vice-chairman, to deal<br />
temporarily with NU's day-to-day affairs.8 Subchan was an<br />
obvious choice as a young unmarried, well-to-do and outspoken<br />
anti-communist who had good contacts not only with some<br />
army generals but also with youths groups from outside NU<br />
circles. Apparently, Subchan was given the task of 'preserving<br />
NU's unity and studying the origins of the coup'. He would also<br />
have been given instructions to make whatever alliances were<br />
necessary to safeguard the interests of NU and its members.9<br />
It is difficult to ascertain the official position taken by NU at<br />
the time to the events of 30 September as all non-government<br />
publications were banned until 7 October. NU archives show that<br />
Ansor made a declaration on 1 October, rejecting a claim made<br />
in a radio broadcast that four NU or NU-affiliated leaders were<br />
members of the 'Revolutionary Council' (a body named by the<br />
coup leaders to which all power in the Republic was to be passed<br />
until new elections could be held).10 Ansor appealed to its<br />
members to remain loyal to Sukarno and not be drawn into the<br />
'counter-revolutionary' action of the Thirtieth of September<br />
Movement. Muslimat, the NU women's association, made a<br />
similar denial on 2 October.11 On 3 October Ansor asked its<br />
members to assist the army in restoring order.12 A large-scale<br />
massacre of communists followed shortly after.<br />
At the same time, the Action Front to Crush the Thirtieth of<br />
September Movement (KAP-Gestapu) was created with Subchan<br />
and Harry Tjan Silalahi of the Catholic party as its leaders.<br />
On 4 October at a mass rally in Jakarta, they asked, in the name of<br />
major political mass organisations which included Ansor, for a<br />
ban on the PKI.13 The KAP-Gestapu was thereafter to play an<br />
important role in the fight against communism.<br />
NU's formal position at this time remained unclear. While<br />
young NU leaders showed great eagerness to react fiercely, the<br />
senior leadership remained very much in the background.14 If we<br />
are to believe Duta Masyarakat, NU's daily newspaper, a<br />
declaration was read in a radio broadcast on 1 October, urging<br />
members to keep loyal to Sukarno and help the army restore<br />
order.15 After several meetings with the army, an NU statement<br />
was finally issued and read on the radio on 4 October, calling for<br />
the PKI and its affiliates to be banned.16 Interestingly, the<br />
declaration was prepared by young NU activists, with Subchan's<br />
blessings, but was not actually signed by the NU leadership until<br />
the following day. On 5 October, at the burial of the six generals<br />
who had been kidnapped and later murdered by the coup leaders,<br />
senior NU leaders were met by two of the party's younger<br />
leaders and pressed to sign.17 Idham Chalid, the NU chairman-<br />
general, signed it later at a cabinet meeting in Bogor.18 Clearly,<br />
the initiative was in the hands of junior NU leaders while senior<br />
leaders were wary of making the wrong steps in a confused<br />
political situation. Thus, by mid-October, ambiguity continued to<br />
Prevail when instructions were given to all NU media, including<br />
Duta Masyarakat, 'to preserve good relations with the PKI, with<br />
Sukarno, and not to offend the Air Force, and the Armed Forces<br />
in general'.19 A 'mission impossible'.<br />
From this point onwards NU began increasingly to take sides<br />
with the army. Apart from Subchan's action in organising anti.<br />
PKI student demonstrations within the KAP-Gestapu and<br />
KAMI,20 NU's role in Parliament became crucial for the legal<br />
transfer of power from Sukarno to General Suharto. Indeed, with<br />
the help of student demonstrations, the army had enjoyed an<br />
initial first success: emergency powers had been handed over by<br />
Sukarno to General Suharto on 11 March 1966. But only the<br />
Consultative Assembly (MPRS) had the power to confirm and<br />
extend these powers. Here, the role of Achmad Sjaichu, a leading<br />
NU figure, was particularly important. As deputy speaker of<br />
Parliament (since 1963), and then as speaker (after June 1966),<br />
he approved three successive parliamentary purges by which<br />
leftist members were replaced by army-backed MPs. Following<br />
his election as speaker, he called for a meeting of the MPRS.<br />
The assembly conferred emergency powers upon Suharto until<br />
such time as elections could be held. It also allowed the army's<br />
further involvement in Parliament through the nomination of<br />
more MPs from the 'functional groups', which served as the<br />
military's political arm.<br />
Six months later, several student groups demanded Sukarno's<br />
dismissal and trial.21 Several of NU's younger leaders added their<br />
voices to the general clamour. One of them, Jusuf Hasyim, a<br />
leading Ansor figure, asked that Sukarno's role in the coup be<br />
examined and that he be tried just like any other citizen. Subchan<br />
lent his support to this position.22 In the following MPRS<br />
session in February 1967, young NU radicals close to the army<br />
pressed the party's more conservative leaders to commit NU to<br />
removing Sukarno and installing Suharto as president. It is<br />
important to note that this move came from the NU youth and<br />
Was entirely contrary to the personal inclinations of some of<br />
their elders. Nevertheless the political climate in early 1967<br />
meant that the senior leadership was under strong pressure to<br />
relent. Finally Nuddin Lubis, an NU parliamentarian, moved a<br />
resolution calling for the dismissal of Sukarno as president, an<br />
inquiry into his role in the failed coup and the election of a new<br />
President. Following this another NU politician, Djamaluddin<br />
Malik, moved a further resolution proposing that Suharto be the<br />
next president. It needs to be pointed out that the initial Lubis<br />
resolution represented a major reversal within NU as Lubis<br />
initially lacked the firm support of the majority of NU MPs at<br />
the time he proposed the resolution.23 Immediately after winning<br />
over the support of the parliamentary group, aided<br />
greatly by deputy rais am, Kiai Bisri Syansuri, he summoned<br />
purnalists to a press conference and deliberately announced the resolution without prior consultation with the NU general-chairman,<br />
Idham Chalid.24 Lubis' statement to the press presented<br />
the NU leadership with a fait accompli.25 NU postponed<br />
its February congress in Bandung, partly to deny a<br />
forum to critics of the resolution, but also to comply with army<br />
warnings that security conditions in West Java were still too<br />
Uncertain to permit the holding of such a major meeting.26<br />
These NU resolutions brought Suharto to the presidency ad<br />
interim, and presented Sukarno with the prospect of a trial (a<br />
threat which was never carried out). NU's action in parliament<br />
would not have been possible without key developments in the<br />
months leading up to the February session. These included<br />
Sukarno's continued support for the PKI, his belittling of the<br />
army's role in the Revolution, a series of sharp price increases<br />
and ongoing student demonstrations. Thus, February 1967 was a<br />
turning Point for the pro-army current within NU. This current<br />
asserted itself at the very moment when the army appeared to<br />
gain decisive ground.<br />
In the period that followed, significant hostility towards<br />
Sukarno emerged from within NU. The West Java Syuriah<br />
(Religious Council) declared that it withdrew the title of Waliyul<br />
Amri Dlaruri Bissyaukah. This title, given to him at a 1954<br />
ulama conference, made him the legitimate ruler of Indonesia, a<br />
state with a Muslim majority but a secular political system. Duta<br />
Masyarakat explained in an editorial that 'a president having a<br />
symbolic function required a noble mind, which Bung Karno does not possess.27 Finally the ulama could be clearly seen to have taken sides.<br />
The dominance of pro-army elements within NU continued<br />
to be evident throughout 1968. During the course of the year<br />
Achmad Sjaichu agreed to a controversial 'reform' of parliament<br />
which reduced the number of MPs overtly aligned with Islamic<br />
concerns to 28%, down from 48% in 1955.28 Sjaichu later<br />
explained that he had had the assurance of Suharto that Islamic<br />
interests would not be sacrificed in these changes. He recalled<br />
that when he voiced his concerns to the president, he was told:<br />
'the kiai are not the only ones to know what is haram<br />
(forbidden in Islam) and what is not'.29 A few weeks later,<br />
General Suharto was elected full president. Sukarno, at that point<br />
under virtual house arrest, died in June 1970. The New Order had<br />
been formally legitimated and, in part, it had been done with the<br />
assistance of a divided Nahdlatul Ulama.<br />
<br />
An Insight into the Disagreement<br />
<br />
Two currents had thus emerged within NU, among not only<br />
the top leadership but also among the student leaders. The more<br />
conservative of these two currents was closer to Sukarno, the<br />
other, more radical current was inclined towards the Armed<br />
Forces. The press talked of there being a dichotomy between<br />
NU-ABRI (ABRI is the acronym for the Armed forces) and NU-<br />
PNI, and also of 'NU-Orba and NU-Orla' (Orba and Orla being<br />
the common abbreviations for 'New Order' and 'Old Order'<br />
respectively).30 The rais am, Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, was<br />
prominent in the pro-Sukarno current, as can be seen from his<br />
declaration of June 1966 that Sukarno would be NU's<br />
presidential candidate forever.31 By that time, Sukarno's demise<br />
was already clear to many politicians, making Kiai Wahab one of<br />
the last prominent supporters of the 'Father of the Revolution'.<br />
Idham Chalid also expressed his genuine sympathy for the ailing<br />
president and visited him in Bogor on several occasions,<br />
including after March 1967, when Sukarno was under effective<br />
house arrest.32 He reportedly told friends he felt sorry for the<br />
lonely former president.33 At the opposite end of the spectrum<br />
within NU was Subchan, whose strong commitment to the<br />
Armed Forces was lauded in Duta Masyarakat as early as June<br />
1966 in these terms: 'Subchan cleverly and forcefully directed<br />
the progressive-revolutionary forces whereas some of our leaders<br />
did not dare face the situation and preferred instead simply to<br />
wait for the next turn of events'. Again in 1966, Achmad<br />
Sjaichu, another leading pro-army figure, strongly expressed the<br />
special ties between the army and NU, comparing them to two<br />
'brothers' .34<br />
It should be noted however that the leadership of NU was<br />
never entirely united in its political outlook. One good example<br />
of this is the situation in 1959, when there was division within<br />
NU about whether or not to accept the 'guided democracy' of<br />
President Sukarno, which put an end to the liberal democracy of<br />
the post-independence years. One NU leader, Imron Rosyadi,<br />
joined forces with those resisting Sukarno's move to gain a<br />
firmer hold on power, and as a result was imprisoned. At the<br />
same time the NU leadership agreed to participate in guided<br />
democracy. Several years later, in the period leading up to the<br />
events of late 1965, Subchan, who, as we have already noted, was<br />
an outspoken anti-communist, tacitly contested Idham Chalid's<br />
leadership of NU. The result was a farcical state of affairs in with<br />
each of them endeavoured to conduct the business of leading NU<br />
from their private homes. (Concerned to ensure that<br />
correspondence emanating from their desks was seen to be<br />
official, when writing letters each would contact staff in the NU<br />
Head Office in order to obtain the 'correct reference number'.)<br />
After the events of 30 September 1965 a number of figures<br />
within NU were immediately persuaded that Sukarno had no<br />
chance of remaining in office because he was seen as too close to<br />
the PKI. Many others, however, felt that as 'Father of the<br />
Revolution' Sukarno was simply irreplaceable. The persistence<br />
of this pro-Sukarno current can be best understood by briefly<br />
examining the history of the close personal relationships<br />
between the nationalist leader and some of the senior Nahdlatul<br />
Ulama leaders.35<br />
As early as 1940, NU decided that it would push for the<br />
election of Sukarno as future president, paradoxically at the very<br />
time when he was clearly expressing his sympathy for the secular<br />
Ataturk model.36 Many factors are responsible for the special<br />
relationship. Of some consequence is the fact that the major NU<br />
leaders and the president both came from East Java, speaking the<br />
same dialect of Javanese. More importantly though is the fact<br />
that Sukarno was a protege of Kiai Wahab's close friend,<br />
Tjokroaminoto, leader of Indonesia's first large-scale Muslim<br />
association, Sarekat Islam. Sukarno also shared with Kiai Wahab<br />
the same taste for Javanese theatre (wayang) and for selamatan<br />
(ritual communal feasts). Another common factor was that both<br />
were married a number of times. Further strengthening the<br />
relationship was the fact that Sukarno allowed Wahab to make<br />
use of a number of important business facilities. Within NU,<br />
there were also genuine feelings of admiration for the brilliant<br />
orator and nationalist leader, to the point where his speeches and<br />
writings were studied in a number of pesantren. There was also<br />
considerable gratitude felt toward Sukarno on account of his<br />
support for the creation of a separate NU political party in<br />
1952. Of greater importance was the strong sentiment of many<br />
NU leaders that priority was to be given to stability in<br />
government rather than to absolute democracy. Thus, Idham<br />
Chalid justified guided democracy by saying that according to<br />
Islam it was not necessarily 'the voice of the majority which is<br />
always the wisest'. Islam, he went on to say, chose to be guided<br />
by 'haq dan ahlinya', i.e., law and its experts.37 The Syuriah<br />
leader, Kiai Wahab, was more cautious than the Tanfidziah<br />
(Executive Board) chairman, and said that 'a leadership without<br />
democracy could only lead to dictatorship while anarchy as well<br />
as dictatorship are contrary to democracy'.38 But discussion with<br />
older NU politicians seems to indicate that what they objected to<br />
most about Guided Democracy was cooperation with the<br />
communists rather than the authoritarian system of government<br />
itself.<br />
In any case, by late 1966 it was clear that the tide had turned<br />
and the pro-Sukarno current reluctantly gave in to the new<br />
situation. Thus, Idham Chalid boasted in September 1966 that<br />
NU was not afraid 'to criticise and be criticised, and when it did<br />
criticise Sukarno, it was out of love for him'.39 The army had<br />
achieved its aim of having Nahdlatul Ulama contribute to the<br />
rise of the New Order, and in the process had gained a degree of<br />
legitimacy.<br />
<br />
The Deterioration of the Relationship Between NU and<br />
the Army<br />
<br />
In the process of NU assisting the ratification of the New<br />
Order regime disagreements arose over the various political<br />
institutions that were being established as well as over the place<br />
of Islam in the post-Sukarno era. These differences soured the<br />
alliance between NU and the army.<br />
<br />
The Political Question<br />
<br />
As early as 1966, even before NU had formally proposed<br />
Suharto as president, there were signs of the authoritarian<br />
inclination of the emerging regime. One draft bill said the press<br />
could 'control, criticise and correct' but only in a 'constructive<br />
way'.40 One of the first points of conflict between NU and the<br />
army was the date for the holding of elections. NU wanted these<br />
to be held in 1967; the new government first proposed 1968 and<br />
then postponed them until 1971. This gave time for the army to<br />
organise its own political vehicle, Golkar. NU also opposed a<br />
1966 plan to reactivate a presidential instruction (Penpres<br />
2/1959) which forbade senior civil servants from joining<br />
political parties. As the main source of civil servants for the<br />
Ministry of Religious Affairs, NU suffered considerably when a<br />
similar measure was later introduced.<br />
The most serious threat came from a set of bills on political<br />
institutions proposed in November 1966. Anxieties within NU<br />
were heightened by one draft bill asking political parties and<br />
social organisations to base themselves on the national ideology,<br />
Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution. It also gave the<br />
government the power to dissolve political parties whenever<br />
they were deemed guilty of 'political misdeeds'.41 The election<br />
bill also came under fire from NU. It rejected the 'district<br />
system' for legislative elections, whereby the regions would<br />
chose candidates rather than a political party. With regions<br />
outside Java being less populated, the political weight of Java,<br />
NU's stronghold, would decrease. Finally, it objected to a<br />
proposal that the army be given 50% of parliamentary seats. NU <br />
wanted it to have only 5%.42<br />
It is interesting to note that these parliamentary debates<br />
occurred in February 1967, at a time when NU was assisting<br />
Suharto's bid to become president through the Lubis and Malik<br />
resolutions. The draft bills had already been issued at the end of<br />
1966 and NU knew of their contents at that time. One should<br />
recognise here the influence of the Sunnite tradition of<br />
government legitimation, with its fear of chaos, in determining<br />
NU political strategy. Thus, Kiai Machrus Ali of Kediri said of<br />
Suharto at the time of the debates on the new political system,<br />
that the future president was like 'dawn after the night'.43 NU<br />
intellectuals were not unaware of the threats of an army-<br />
dominated government, as can be seen in one Duta Masyarakat<br />
editorial: 'The people's sovereignty should be applied concretely<br />
in laws and should not be a consumption object given in the form<br />
of fairy tales'.44 The emergence of two new currents was already<br />
evident: a conservative current and a radical anti-army current<br />
parallel to the pro-army and pro-Sukarno currents, though not<br />
always coinciding.<br />
In July 1967, at its Bandung congress, NU began, however, to<br />
flex its muscles. It requested early elections, the cancellation of<br />
the ban on senior civil servants' membership of political parties,<br />
an anti-corruption bill and a more openly anti-Israel foreign<br />
policy. Moreover, it complained of the poor economic<br />
conditions faced by batik producers in such major textile<br />
production areas as Tasikmalaya, West Java, and demanded that<br />
these things be borne in mind by the government as it<br />
formulated policy.45<br />
Slowly but surely, during the course of 1968, Duta<br />
Masyarakat started to become more outspoken, with the pro-<br />
army-turned-radical Subchan being more and more often quoted<br />
by the conservative daily newspaper. During a meeting of the<br />
MPRS in 1968, Subchan opposed the election of Suharto, arguing<br />
that he should be elected only after legislative elections as MPs<br />
make up half of the Assembly electing the president. Subchan<br />
soon became one of the most outspoken opponents of the New<br />
Order political system. This climaxed in the 1971 legislative<br />
elections when violence erupted between the army and NU<br />
sympathisers.<br />
<br />
The Religious Question<br />
<br />
The second vexed issue in the relationship between the army<br />
and NU during the first years of the New Order was the question<br />
of Islam's official role in the Indonesian state and society.<br />
The question of the Syari'ah (Islamic Law) and its legislative<br />
relationship with the state had been around since the preparation<br />
for independence in June 1945. A preliminary agreement had<br />
been reached on what was called the 'Jakarta Charter', by which<br />
it was suggested that the Constitution require obedience to the<br />
Syari'ah from all Indonesian Muslims.46 In August 1945, NU<br />
gave in to pleas by the largely Christian eastern islands, objecting<br />
that they would not be part of an Islamic state. The Charter was<br />
thus abandoned. The national ideology, Pancasila, made up of<br />
five universal principles, including 'belief in one almighty God',<br />
made no special reference to Islam.47 But the subject reappeared<br />
during the Constituent Assembly debates in 1959. Sukarno<br />
unilaterally dissolved the Constituent Assembly after neither<br />
Islamic nor secular groups were able to achieve the required two-<br />
thirds majority. The following compromise was worked out with<br />
NU: a return to the 1945 Constitution would be proclaimed while<br />
the Jakarta Charter with its reference to the Syari'ah would be<br />
recognised as 'inspiring' and 'being at one with' the<br />
Constitution.<br />
Under the New Order, Pancasila was understood to exclude<br />
any ideology, communist or religious. It became the only<br />
accepted reference while the Jakarta Charter increasingly became<br />
a taboo subject. As early as 1966, the army became worried when<br />
the Jakarta Charter began to surface again in Islamic public<br />
discourse. During a large street parade held for NU's fortieth<br />
anniversary in January 1966, banners were reportedly seen<br />
asking for a return to the Charter. I have found no confirmation<br />
other than verbal of the presence of such banners and NU says<br />
nowadays that if there were any, they were not officially<br />
sanctioned. Whatever the case, during the following days, the<br />
army-backed press denied NU's alleged support for an Islamic<br />
state.48 The fact is that the Jakarta Charter was used as a<br />
legitimate reference during these early years of the New Order.<br />
Thus, in April 1966, at a meeting of NU's Party Council in<br />
Bogor, an official NU announcement said: 'Since the State is<br />
founded on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which cannot<br />
be separated from the Jakarta Charter, the way is open to<br />
implement the party's ideals'. It further said: 'If Pancasila and<br />
the 1945 Constitution are applied properly in the life of the<br />
state, and if the Jakarta Charter is properly applied in society,<br />
the result will be a society in conformity with the party's<br />
ideals'.49<br />
Despite this, it seems that NU did not request a revision of<br />
the Constitution in favour of the Jakarta Charter, and no longer<br />
placed the Charter in opposition to Pancasila as had been done<br />
in 1959. Later, at the MPRS meeting of July 1966, NU and<br />
Muslim MPs in general asked that the Charter continue to be<br />
mentioned in official texts.50 Finally, it was decided that<br />
mention would only be made of 'the fact' that the Jakarta<br />
Charter had been named in the 1959 presidential decree.51 This<br />
amounted to a mild recognition of the Charter. It failed,<br />
however, to be mentioned as one of the sources of law. NU had<br />
more success when the MPRS agreed to make religious education<br />
compulsory, a unanimous decision aimed at countering<br />
communism, which has been seen as a major contribution to the<br />
further Islamisation of the archipelago.<br />
In 1967, the Charter became the subject of further debate in<br />
the press. The fact that NU defended the Charter's legitimacy<br />
caused it to be branded 'neo-Darul Islam', after the violent<br />
Muslim rebellion in West Java during the late 1940s and 1950s.<br />
During MPRS commission discussions, proposals in favour of<br />
Islam arose but it is difficult to have a clear picture of the real<br />
demands being made by Islamic groups as proceedings were held<br />
behind closed doors. The press practised self-censorship and the<br />
Charter was steadily becoming a forbidden subject. The ulama<br />
adapted to the new situation, insisting on the Charter's<br />
legitimacy but avoiding any confrontation between Pancasila and<br />
Islam. The Sunnite tradition of compromise was again apparent<br />
with a call from Kiai Machrus Ali to 'Keep away from actions or<br />
words that can provoke anger among other people. According to<br />
Islamic law, any action that can disturb the society's order is a<br />
major sin that will be judged by God'.52<br />
Another conflict emerged between the secular and Islamic<br />
forces when a draft bill on marriage for Muslims was heartily<br />
supported by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, an NU stronghold<br />
as we have seen. The draft bill took the Jakarta Charter as a<br />
reference and proposed that 'laws in accordance with the Muslim<br />
Syari'ah could be issued especially for Muslims'. 53 This draft bill<br />
was quickly rejected by secular and non-Muslim groups as<br />
opening the way to a juridical dualism.<br />
The controversy over the Charter intensified in 1968, and<br />
one can wonder whether this intensification was not tied to the<br />
political parties' increased marginalisation by the army's inroads<br />
into Indonesian politics. NU, together with other Islamic groups,<br />
wanted the Charter mentioned and thus legalised by the MPRS as<br />
part of the Broad Policy Guidelines (GBHN). Furthermore,<br />
Islamic groups wanted the definition of human rights to ban<br />
religious conversions (ganti agama). Having elected Suharto full<br />
president, the MPRS finished its sessions without making any<br />
decision on the Charter and the human rights questions, and the<br />
Armed Forces opposed the continuation of the debates.54 NU<br />
protested vehemently. Nuddin Lubis lashed out at Catholics and<br />
sections of the functional groups which he said were 'without<br />
roots in society [and] which did everything to see to it that the<br />
commission works be rejected'.55 A few days later, on 8 April,<br />
Suharto summoned the four Islamic parties, and asked them to<br />
agree among themselves on the meaning of the Charter. A<br />
commission directed by Prawoto Mangkusasmito, a former<br />
Masyumi leader, was given the task of elaborating a common<br />
vision. Kiai Masykur represented NU in that commission.56<br />
The anniversary of the Charter on 22 June was<br />
commemorated with a plethora of declarations. Duta<br />
Masyarakat published a statement of the commemoration<br />
committee signed by the Pemuda Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Islam<br />
Pusat (PMPI), an association of youth Muslim organisations<br />
which included Ansor. It said, amongst other things: 'The<br />
implementation of the Syari'ah does not mean that Indonesia<br />
would be an Islamic state. The Syari'ah brings divine grace and<br />
happiness for the Nation and its people on earth and in<br />
heaven'.57 The second point of the statement read: 'the<br />
obligation of religious practice (ibadah) reinforces morals and<br />
character and is thus more powerful than appeals and<br />
exhortations.' This apologetic declaration seemed to imply the<br />
<br />
******<br />
<br />
1. During the Second World War, after an initial period of strained<br />
relations with Nahdlatul Ulama, the Japanese cleverly courted Islam by the establishment of the Shumubu. This cooperation led to the creation of a national Islamic Council, Masyumi, which later became the largest Islamic political party.<br />
<br />
2 Several medieval Sunni thinkers have tried to bring constitutional<br />
theory into line with political reality, the chief concern being to<br />
Preserve Islam and its law through political concessions. With the<br />
argument that disorder and chaos are more dangerous than tyranny or<br />
injustice, legitimation could be given to a strong sultan, even if he were a despot. Thus, if one is to conform exclusively to just orders, al-Ghazali (1058-1111) asked: 'Shall we stop obeying the laws? Shall we revoke the kadis? (...) Shall we let the people live in sin? Or shall we continue, recognising that what is inanimate actually exists, that all administrative acts remain valid, given the circumstances and the necessities of the moment?' (in G.E. von Grunebaum, L'lslam medieval, Payot, Paris, 1962: p. 185). Al-Mawardi and al-Baqillani have also influenced NU'S political thinking.<br />
<br />
3 On this, see Hughes 1967, Walkin 1969 and Cribb 1990. This conflict<br />
had in fact began sporadically in the early 1960s when Muslim<br />
landowners resisted PKI-inspired campaigns to force land reforms.<br />
<br />
4 Refer to Cribb 1990: 26; Hughes 1967:154; and Crouch 1979:152.<br />
<br />
5 Interview with Chalid Mawardi, an Ansor delegate present<br />
at the meeting (1991). The fact-finding commission was appointed by<br />
President Sukarno at the end of December 1965. It estimated that 54,000 had been killed in East Java alone. The number of victims was minimised, however, and the commonly accepted estimate was between 250,000 and 500,000 People killed across the archipelago (Crouch 1978:155-156).<br />
<br />
6 Crouch 1978:97. There are several theories on the origins of the coup. The official lndonesian version has it that the coup was the work of the PKI, a version contested by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey from Cornell university. Scholars have been debating in favour or against one Or the other theory. Although it seems clear that there was indeed some PKI involvement, the extent of it remains uncertain.<br />
<br />
7 Interview with Moenasir, 3 December 1994.<br />
<br />
8 Interview with Syah Manaf, 1991. Present at the meeting were Kiai<br />
Masykur, a member of the NU's supreme religious council, the Syuriah,<br />
Idham Chalid, the Tanfidziah chairman, and Syaf Manaf, from NU's<br />
political bureau. Moenasir confirmed such a mandate was given to<br />
Subchan but was unaware of the time and place it was given to him<br />
(Interview, 3 December 1994).<br />
<br />
9 Interview with Syah Manaf, 1991.<br />
<br />
10 'Pernyataan pujuk pimpinan gerakan Pemuda Ansor', signed by Jahja<br />
Ubaied, its president, and by Chalid Mawardi (National archives,<br />
Jakarta). The list of Revolutionary Council members was drawn up<br />
without consultation and most nominees denied having any knowledge<br />
of it (Crouch 1979: 98).<br />
<br />
11 Interview with Mrs. Asmah Sjachruni, a senior NU leader, 1991. The NU<br />
leaders named were: KH Fattah Yasin, A. M. Eahman, Jahya Ubaied and<br />
Mahmudah Mawardi from the Muslimat. signed by the chairman, H. Aยท<br />
<br />
12 'Instruksi 3 Oktober, PP GP Ansor',<br />
Chamid Wijaya (National Archives, Jakarta).<br />
<br />
13 Berita Yudha, 5 October 1965.<br />
<br />
14 General Nasution passed on a letter to Idham Chalid explaining the<br />
situation and expressing his thankfulness in advance for a firm position from NU (Interview with KH M. Moenasir, 3 December 1994).<br />
<br />
15 Duta Masyarakat, 7 October 1965. I have found no trace of the original Statement, which could have confirmed that it was actually_ made as early BS 1 October. Moreover, the national radio station was in the hands of the September Movement leaders until 1 October at 7 p.m.<br />
<br />
16 Ibid. Berita Yudha, 6 October 1965, published the entire statement<br />
bearing the date of 5 October.<br />
<br />
17 Interview With Jusuf Hasyim, 1992.<br />
<br />
18 Idham Chalid could not be found prior to the cabinet meeting. Knowing<br />
that he would attend the Bogor meeting, a student was sent to Bogor to Obtain his signature. (Interview with H. Moenasir, 2 December 1994).<br />
<br />
19 'Surat PBNU, Pedoman Politik Pemberitaan Harian NU', 14 October<br />
1965, sent to five media outlets (National Archives, Jakarta).<br />
<br />
20 Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, the students' action front,<br />
organised major demonstrations, bringing an important contribution, in coordination with the army, to the destabilisation of the Old Order.<br />
<br />
21 Refer to Crouch 1978: 212.<br />
<br />
22 Duta Masyarakat, 11 January 1967.<br />
<br />
23 He acted with the understanding and backing of the army.<br />
<br />
24 This parliamentary session of 9 February ended at 1 am. One hour later, Lubis called a press conference.<br />
<br />
25 Interview With Nuddin Lubis, 1991.<br />
<br />
26 Interview with Nuddin Lubis, August 1991.<br />
<br />
27 Duta Masyarakat, 10 March 1967<br />
<br />
28 Angkatan Baru, 21 March 1968; and Ward 1968:42.<br />
<br />
29 Sjaichu 1991:69.<br />
<br />
30 Duta Masyarakat, 5 April, 29 May, 3 July and 11 July 1967.<br />
<br />
31 Antara, 7 June 1966.<br />
<br />
32 After the MPRS session of March 1967, Sukarno remained in his palaces<br />
but it soon apparent that he was under virtual house arrest. In May 1967, he was no longer allowed to use his titles (Crouch 1978: 220).<br />
<br />
33 Interview with General Nasution, 1991.<br />
<br />
34 Duta Masyarakat, 13 August 1966.<br />
<br />
35 It is important to note that the NU was politically dominated by just a few senior leaders, those interested in politics, be they from the<br />
Tanfidziah (Executive Board) like Idham Chalid or from the Syuriah like Kiai Bisri. It was a top-down organisation and the mass membership had little impact on every day decisions.<br />
<br />
36 See Berita Nahdlatoel Ulama, Surabaya, 1 July 1940, p. 8/225, about<br />
NU's reaction to Sukarno's defence of Kemal Ataturk. On Sukarno's<br />
choice as future president, see Anam 1985: 112.<br />
<br />
37 Speech called 'Islam dan Demokrasi Terpimpin', given at PTI NU,<br />
Fakultas Hukum Islam where Idham was teacher (dosen luar biasa).<br />
<br />
38 Zuhri 1987: 475.<br />
<br />
39 Duta Masyarakat, 21 September 1966.<br />
<br />
40 Duta Masyarakat, 12 November 1966.<br />
<br />
41 Duta Masyarakat, 24 February 1967.<br />
<br />
42 Duta Masyarakat, 24 March 1967. On the new political system put into<br />
place by the New Order, see Feith 1968.<br />
<br />
43 Duta Masyarakat, 9 March 1967.<br />
<br />
44 Duta Masyarakat, 22 February 1967.<br />
<br />
45 Duta Masyarakat, 14 July 1967.<br />
<br />
46 The famous phrase agreed upon on 22 June 1945 and known as the<br />
Jakarta Charter is: 'Belief in God with the obligation for Muslims to<br />
implement the Syari'ah in accordance with a just humanity'. It was never clear what it exactly meant or how the obligation would be carried out.<br />
<br />
47 In the months preceding independence in 1945, Sukarno proposed the<br />
five universal principles of Pancasila (belief in God, nationalism,<br />
humanitarianism, democracy and social justice). Any reference to a<br />
religion was avoided in order to create unity in this diverse nation.<br />
Sukarno's main argument was that, if]slam was indeed the majority<br />
religion, Parliament would issue laws in conformity with Islam.<br />
<br />
48 Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersenjata, 31 January 1966.<br />
<br />
49 Antara, 16 April 1966.<br />
<br />
50 Nugroho 1985:38.<br />
<br />
51 'TAP XX/MPRS/1966 tentang memorandum DPR-GR mengenai sumbertertib hukum Republik Indonesia dan Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundang RI'. <br />
<br />
52 Duta Masyarakat, 9 March 1967.<br />
<br />
53 'Pendjelasan mengenai Undang Undang tentang Pokok-pokok peraturan pernikahan umat islam. Pendjelasan Umum', artikel 2-4.<br />
<br />
54 Nasution 1989, jilid 8:105-106.<br />
<br />
55 Duta Masyarakat, 3 April 1968.<br />
<br />
56 Interview with Lukman Harun of the Muhammadiyah, January 1993.<br />
<br />
57 Duta Masyarakat, 22 June 1966.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-50059138866444380162015-03-15T08:00:00.000+07:002015-03-15T08:00:01.209+07:00Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia. Next 3<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
The formation of the Ali cabinet was of considerable<br />
significance. Firstly, it demonstrated how NU under the<br />
pragmatic leadership of Wahab Chasbullah could strengthen the<br />
middle ground of Indonesian politics and, in certain<br />
circumstances, combine with other parties to isolate Masyumi<br />
Secondly, as the longest-serving government during the seven-<br />
year period of parliamentary democracy, the Ali cabinet allowed<br />
NU to consolidate itself as a political force. For almost two<br />
years the party used its position in government to provide<br />
resources, employment and a wide range of other preferments to<br />
its members and supporters.78 The patronage networks<br />
established during this period greatly assisted the party's<br />
recruitment and electoral activities and would continue to serve<br />
NU throughout the remainder of the Sukarno years.<br />
At the 1955 general election NU emerged as the third largest<br />
party in Indonesia, attracting almost seven million votes or<br />
18.4% of the national total and lifting its parliamentary<br />
representation from 8 to 45.79 The result caused jubilation<br />
within the party. Whilst many had hoped for a strong showing,<br />
few seriously believed such an outcome was likely. The party's<br />
own campaign committee had predicted on election eve that NU<br />
would only capture between 20-25 seats.80<br />
The election result was not only a victory for the party but<br />
also a personal triumph for Wahab. It was he who had led NU's<br />
move into politics and persuaded his more sceptical colleagues of<br />
the organisation's capacity to become an independent and<br />
influential party. His sagacity and prescience now seemed<br />
confirmed by NU's remarkable electoral success. The post-<br />
election period marked the peak of his career and power within<br />
the party. Amongst the grassroots of NU, where a strong culture<br />
of venerating senior kiai existed, Wahab was increasingly<br />
acclaimed as a wali, and many stories circulated extolling his<br />
oracular and magical abilities.81<br />
Wahab used his authority during this time to promote<br />
proteges of a pragmatic persuasion to high office in NU. At the<br />
party congress in Medan in December 1956 several of his most<br />
loyal lieutenants were appointed to strategic positions within the<br />
organisation. Chief among them was Idham Chalid, who replaced<br />
KH Mohammad Dachlan as the chairman-general of the<br />
Tanfidziah (Executive Board).82 He had developed a close<br />
relationship with Wahab in the early 1950s, often<br />
accompanying him on his travels to NU branches. A shrewd but<br />
cautious man with a keen political instinct, Idham prospered<br />
under Wahab's tutelage, learning much about organisational,<br />
debating and oratorical techniques whilst also building up his own<br />
network of support within the party. Other Wahab supporters to<br />
be elevated included Saifuddin Zuhri, who became secretary-<br />
general, and the wealthy businessman and film producer,<br />
Djamaluddin Malik, who became third chairman of the NU<br />
board. These appointments strengthened the pro-Wahab<br />
element within the NU leadership, with many continuing to be<br />
influential figures in the party until the 1970s and 1980s.<br />
Not all of Wahab's activities in the mid- to late 1950s<br />
showed good judgement. His apparent willingness to use his<br />
position in NU and connections with government to advance his<br />
family's pecuniary interests and career prospects was a particular<br />
source of criticism, both within the party and without. Although<br />
nepotism is not uncommon in the tightly-knit kinship groups of<br />
Javanese ulama, many NU leaders and cadre looked askance at<br />
Wahab's ardent promotion of, amongst others, his eldest son,<br />
Wahib Wahab, and stepson, Achmad Sjaichu, both of whom had<br />
been elected to parliament in 1955.83 Wahab's business dealings,<br />
especially those involving Chinese entrepreneurs or government<br />
licences, also gave rise to concern. Several of these dealings<br />
came under public scrutiny in 1956 when sections of the Jakarta<br />
press began publishing allegations that Wahab and Wahib had<br />
sought preferential government treatment for a number of<br />
commercial ventures.84 While it is difficult to determine the<br />
validity of these accusations it would not have been surprising,<br />
given the frequency with which political leaders of the time<br />
extracted personal gain from public office, for Wahab to have<br />
engaged in such practices. Despite maintaining a relatively<br />
simple Personal lifestyle, the financial needs of his pesantren and<br />
large family would have been considerable.85<br />
<br />
The Accommodation of Guided Democracy<br />
<br />
The period from 1957 to 1960 was one of great upheaval in<br />
Indonesian politics as President Sukarno, with support from the<br />
army, progressively dismantled the existing system of<br />
parliamentary democracy and replaced it with the more<br />
authoritarian 'guided democracy'. The transition to guided<br />
democracy created serious tensions within the NU leadership as<br />
it raised fundamental questions regarding the future shape of<br />
Indonesian politics and NU's place within it. There were three<br />
elements of this transition process which proved especially<br />
divisive for NU: firstly, the shift of power from a<br />
democratically-elected parliament and parties to the executive<br />
and particularly the President; secondly, the marginalisation of<br />
Masyumi resulting from its iii-fated involvement in the regional<br />
rebellions and staunch opposition to Sukarno's political reforms;<br />
and thirdly, the expanding role and influence of the PKI and<br />
other left-wing groups in government. The hardliners within NU<br />
strongly objected to each of these aspects whereas the<br />
pragmatists were prepared to accept them.<br />
According to the hardliners it would be sinful for the party to<br />
Support or condone any actions which breached the principles of<br />
democracy and arbitrarily reduced the influence of Islam whilst<br />
bolstering that of communism. Hence, opposition to guided<br />
democracy was a moral imperative. Some argued it was also a<br />
Sound political strategy to thwart Sukarno's initiatives. They<br />
reasoned that for Sukarno to form a credible coalition<br />
government he would need the participation of at least one of<br />
the two major Islamic parties. If NU joined with Masyumi in<br />
rejecting guided democracy, Sukarno would be forced to temper<br />
abandon hi, plans and the Islamic parties would have<br />
demonstrated their combined power to set the political agenda.<br />
The pragmatists' accommodatory approach to guided<br />
democracy reflected, above all else, a conviction that far greater<br />
danger lay in resistance than in acquiescence. It was a stance<br />
which, characteristically, emphasised risk minimisation and<br />
retention of political influence as a means of protecting the<br />
umat. Central to their argument was a belief that Sukarno and<br />
the army now held sufficient power to dictate the terms of the<br />
political restructuring and punish those who resisted. Opposition<br />
was thus not only futile but also extremely dangerous for NU and<br />
its constituency. Far better, they argued, for NU to remain<br />
within government from whence it could exert a moderating<br />
influence on Sukarno and counter the activities of the PKI.<br />
Some of the more pro-Sukarno pragmatists were attracted to the<br />
notion of guided democracy, particularly as it allowed a greater<br />
role for the President to act as a unifying figure and surmount<br />
Indonesia's political ills. As for the fate of Masyumi, many<br />
pragmatists believed that its problems were largely self-inflicted.<br />
Its rigid opposition to Sukarno's plans as well as its complicity in<br />
the regional rebellions had discredited the party and ultimately<br />
harmed the interests of both political Islam and<br />
parliamentarianism. In any case, Masyumi's demise as a political<br />
force made it doubly important for NU to provide Islamic<br />
representation within the government.<br />
There were two important occasions during the transition to<br />
guided democracy when the party was forced to choose between<br />
the pragmatist and hardline positions. These concerned the issue<br />
of participation in, and by extension, approval of, newly created<br />
institutions in the transition process. The first, in early 1957,<br />
was the extra-parliamentary Kabinet Karya (Working Cabinet),<br />
and the second, in mid-1960, was the Sukarno-appointed<br />
Gotong-Royong (Mutual Assistance) Parliament. In both cases<br />
there was considerable ambivalence among NU leaders not yet<br />
committed to either a hardline or pragmatic stance. Many<br />
acknowledged the validity of the hardliners' arguments about<br />
upholding democracy, showing loyalty to Masyumi and resisting<br />
the leftwards movement of Indonesian politics, but were also<br />
deeply apprehensive about the risks to NU of opposing guided<br />
democracy. The pragmatists eventually won by persuading their<br />
colleagues that risk avoidance was of higher priority.<br />
Wahab, as NU's pre-eminent ulama-politician, figured<br />
prominently in gaining majority support for the pragmatist<br />
position In the tense meetings which decided NU's stance he<br />
dominated proceedings, repeatedly warning his colleagues that<br />
there was grave danger in resisting Sukarno's demands and that<br />
their paramount responsibility as Islamic leaders was to safeguard<br />
their faith and party from such danger. He also shrewdly coaxed<br />
waverers with the argument that NU should enter the cabinet<br />
while it had the chance, and could later withdraw should the<br />
government's performance prove unsatisfactory. Such a course<br />
removed the risk of immediate political isolation but still left the<br />
party with the option of opposing Sukarno's actions at a later<br />
date. He encapsulated this principle in the catchphrase: 'enter<br />
first; leaving is easy' (masuk dulu; keluar gampang).86 To<br />
appease the hardliners he promised that NU would refuse to join<br />
any cabinet which contained PKI members. Participation in the<br />
Kabinet Karya was finally agreed to on the basis of maslahah,<br />
with the NU leadership declaring it would endorse the four NU<br />
ministers appointed by Sukarno 'in order to bring the greatest<br />
possible benefit for us all...or at the very least minimise harm<br />
(madlarraat)'.87<br />
The issue of the Gotong-Royong Parliament proved more<br />
intractable. Certain hardline ulama, notably Bisri Syansuri and<br />
Achmad Siddiq, argued that participation would be tantamount to<br />
condoning ghasab, a jurisprudential term referring to the<br />
arrogation of another's property or rights. Sukarno, they<br />
asserted, had violated the rights of electors and the dismissed<br />
Parliamentarians by arbitrarily dissolving the popularly-elected<br />
legislature and replacing it with a parliament of largely<br />
government appointees. Despite the efforts of Wahab and his<br />
fellow pragmatists, these hardliners remained implacable, forcing<br />
the NU Syuriah to issue a split decision which stated that,<br />
according to Islamic law, involvement in the new parliament was<br />
'(1) allowed with intention of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar [ie<br />
promoting good and preventing evil] or (2) disallowed because it<br />
entails ghasab'.88 As a result, NU nominees to the Gotong-<br />
Royong parliament were free either to accept or to reject<br />
appointment based on whether they believed it to be a case of<br />
amar ma'ruf nahi munkar or ghasab.89 At a series of<br />
subsequent party meetings Wahab strongly urged NU's nominees<br />
to take up their appointments in order to maintain a share of<br />
political power which could be used to protect the umat in the<br />
uncertain times ahead. All but three of NU's 55 nominees later<br />
accepted positions in parliament.90<br />
Its acquiescence to the process of political restructuring<br />
allowed NU to secure its position within the system of guided<br />
democracy. The forced dissolution of Masyumi in September<br />
1960 left NU as the sole major Islamic party and the chief<br />
religious component in Sukarno's Nasakom (an acronym formed<br />
from nasionalisme, agama and komunisme or nationalism,<br />
religion and communism). In reality its influence, like that of<br />
the PNI, was greatly reduced, with power now increasingly<br />
concentrated in the hands of the President, the army, and the<br />
PKI. NU was able, however, to use its position in government to<br />
further build its organisational structure and patronage networks<br />
as well as to counter the activities of the PKI.<br />
Wahab Chasbullah's dominance of the party during the late<br />
1950s owed much to his ability to persuade his colleagues that<br />
pragmatism was not only politically sensible but religiously<br />
correct as well. As the party's most experienced politician and<br />
also the one closest to Sukarno, his political views carried<br />
immense weight. In religious debates he spoke with the assurance<br />
of an ulama who had spent much of his life advocating genera:<br />
principles of risk minimisation and expedience. Though lacking<br />
the jurisprudential scholarship of Bisri Syansuri or Achmad<br />
Siddiq, he drew on his debating skills and knowledge of Islamic<br />
history, typically citing precedents from Sunni Islam's long<br />
tradition of political quietism. He was also adept at appealing to<br />
the non-confrontationist proclivities of NU's predominantly<br />
Javanese leadership. In addition to his political and religious<br />
authority Wahab's forceful personality and preparedness to take<br />
advantage of NU's culture of deference to senior kiai made him a<br />
formidable force within the party. He was not, however, the<br />
dictator that his critics claimed him to be. On those occasions<br />
when he swayed the party to a particular course, it was usually<br />
because it found his reasoning persuasive. When he was<br />
unconvincing, his proposals were rejected.91<br />
<br />
Twilight Years<br />
<br />
Wahab's role and influence within the party declined<br />
progressively throughout the 1960s. From the early part of the<br />
decade his health began to deteriorate causing him to spend an<br />
increasing amount of time at his pesantren and rely ever more<br />
heavily Upon trusted lieutenants such as Idham Chalid and<br />
Saifuddin Zuhri. His personal morale and prestige within NU were<br />
also dented by the actions of Wahib Wahab who had been<br />
appointed Minister of Religious Affairs in 1959. His inept<br />
handling of this portfolio attracted considerable criticism from<br />
the Muslim community and reached an ignominious conclusion<br />
19 February 1962 when Wahib was forced to resign from cabinet<br />
over his involvement in a foreign currency scandal.92 Having<br />
vigorously promoted Wahib's career both within NU and the<br />
government Wahab was now acutely embarrassed by his son's<br />
misdeeds.93 The damage to the party's reputation caused many<br />
NU members to lament the cost of Wahab's ill-judged nepotism.<br />
After 1963 his authority was further weakened by the<br />
emergence within NU of a more militant anti-communist and<br />
anti-Sukarno movement which enjoyed strong support in the<br />
party's youth and veterans' organisations. Whilst the Wahab-<br />
Idham group within the party's central leadership continued the<br />
policy of accommodation, the militants mounted a campaign of<br />
direct opposition to PKI activities and the leftwards drift of<br />
Indonesian politics under guided democracy. This campaign<br />
included mobilising NU members to physically resist the PKI's<br />
unilateral land reform offensive in 1964 and joining with the<br />
army and other anti-communist groups in eliminating, by mass<br />
execution and detention, the PKI following the 1965 coup<br />
attempt. Wahab played only an incidental role in these<br />
activities. Although he was briefed about the militants' activities<br />
and occasionally asked to approve them formally, he had little<br />
direct input into their planning or decision-making. In the<br />
immediate aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup, for example,<br />
it was the younger leaders such as Subchan Z.E., Jusuf Hasjim,<br />
Zamroni, Moenaser and Chalid Mawardi who took the initiative<br />
in formulating NU's staunchly anti-PKI stance. Wahab went<br />
along with the policy of denouncing the PKI but his appeals for<br />
caution and attempts to defend Sukarno did little to dampen the<br />
fervour of the militants.94<br />
The nadir of his long career came during the 24th NU<br />
Congress held in Bandung in July 1967. Wahab's support base<br />
within the party was crumbling with many delegates believing<br />
that he was no longer capable or politically acceptable as rais<br />
am. Now in his eighties Wahab was stricken with blindness and<br />
several other ailments which severely hampered his movements.<br />
Moreover, at a time when NU was keen to demonstrate its<br />
repudiation of the old guided democracy regime and endorsement<br />
of General Suharto's 'New Order', Wahab's leadership had<br />
become anachronistic. No other NU leader had been more<br />
closely associated with Sukarno or more identified with guided<br />
democracy. Anti-Wahab sentiment was further inflamed by his<br />
clumsy attempts prior to the congress to suspend Subchan in<br />
order to improve the prospects of Sjaichu and Idham.95 In the<br />
subsequent ballot to elect the rais am, Bisri Syansuri received a<br />
clear majority of the votes. He refused, however, to accept the<br />
position whilst his friend and brother-in-law remained alive. The<br />
congress was forced, by default, to reappoint Wahab, though he<br />
now bore the indignity of being the first incumbent president of<br />
NU to lose an election ballot.96<br />
Most of Wahab's last years were spent quietly at<br />
Tambakberas. Effective leadership of NU fell increasingly to<br />
Bisri Syansuri and Idham Chalid. In December 1971 Wahab,<br />
despite being gravely ill, attended his 25th and final NU congress<br />
in Surabaya. Although too sick to deliver his presidential address<br />
or take much part in proceedings he was re-elected rais am by<br />
acclamation. He died at Jombang on 29 December, four days<br />
after the congress closed.97<br />
<br />
Conclusion<br />
<br />
Wahab Chasbullah's influence upon Indonesian Islam and<br />
politics was considerable. For almost 50 years he served as a<br />
pivotal figure in the defence, organisation and political<br />
development of traditionalist Islam. This began in the late 1910s<br />
with his involvement in the founding of Taswirul Afkar,<br />
Nahdlatul Wathan, and Nahdlatul Tujar, and continued in the<br />
early 1920s when he rose to national prominence as an advocate<br />
of traditionalist values and interests at Al-Islam congresses and<br />
public meetings. The high point of his early career was his<br />
central role in the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926,<br />
which soon became the main representative body for<br />
traditionalist Muslims. His involvement in the forming of MIAI<br />
eleven years later is also noteworthy. But his period of greatest<br />
power came during the 1950s when, as rais am, he led NU from<br />
Masyumi and oversaw its transformation from a small and<br />
hesitant opposition party into the largest, most politically<br />
secure Islamic party in Indonesia. The success of the party was<br />
in no small measure due to Wahab's ability to steer it towards a<br />
pragmatic and accommodatory course from which it could enter<br />
the political mainstream.<br />
<br />
Judgements about the moral and qualitative aspects of<br />
Wahab's career will depend upon the normative criteria used. He<br />
was, above all else, an arch-traditionalist with a deep<br />
commitment to fostering and developing traditional Islam in<br />
order to ensure its place in a rapidly changing society and state<br />
His willingness to subordinate principles of Islamic solidarity and<br />
liberal democracy to the interests of traditionalist advancement<br />
has been much criticised as also has his dubious business practices,<br />
his nepotism and autocratic and domineering manner. For his<br />
detractors, they are evidence of an unscrupulous, intellectually<br />
narrow and self-interested personality.<br />
Despite the validity of some of these criticisms, they should<br />
not overshadow the magnitude of Wahab's achievements; no<br />
other Person has been so influential in shaping traditionalist<br />
responses to a variety of challenges over such a long period of<br />
time. Wahab Chasbullah deserves to be regarded as the most<br />
significant traditionalist Islamic leader in Indonesia this century.<br />
detractors, they are evidence of an unscrupulous, intellectually<br />
narrow and self-interested personality.<br />
Despite the validity of some of these criticisms, they should<br />
not overshadow the magnitude of Wahab's achievements; no<br />
other person has been so influential in shaping traditionalist<br />
responses to a variety of challenges over such a long period of<br />
time. Wahab Chasbullah deserves to be regarded as the most<br />
significant traditionalist Islamic leader in Indonesia this century.<br />
<br />
<br />
*****<br />
<br />
78 NU was by no means unique in using government to expand its<br />
patronage networks. Most parties from the time of this Ali cabinet<br />
engaged in the practice to some degree, with the PNI the most notorious exponent.<br />
<br />
79 Feith, pp.434-35. Masyumi gained 20.9% of the vote and 57 seats I"<br />
1956, NU's numbers in parliament rose to 47 when two Chinese<br />
minority representatives, Tan Eng Hong and Tan Kiem Liong (later<br />
Mohammad Hasan), joined the NU faction.<br />
<br />
80 Interview with KH Idham Chalid, Jakarta, 15 June 1992.<br />
<br />
81 These stories often focused on the special relationship which was said to exist between Wahab and God. His knowledge was claimed to have been received directly from God (laduni) rather than acquired by learning. He was also said to have gained divine guidance through istikharah, a Special prayer seeking God's help in deciding how best to resolve intractable problems. Other stories told of his magical powers, including the ability to be in several places simultaneously as well as make himself and others invisible.<br />
<br />
82 Dachlan's relations with Wahab had often been strained. His strict<br />
adherence to official procedures and party regulations frustrated Wahab end others who usually relied upon informal networks within the organisation. He was also one of the few NU executives prepared to query openly Wahab's actions. Consequently, prior to the Medan<br />
congress Wahab sanctioned a campaign by Idham's supporters to<br />
remove Dachlan. Interviews with Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 6 December<br />
1991 and 22 July 1992, and Achmad Sjahri, Bekasi, 15 January 1992.<br />
<br />
83 Wahib was the focus of much of this disquiet. Most observers believed he lacked the judgement and diligence to hold the high political office which his father sought to obtain for him. His subsequent appointment as Minister of Civilian-Military Cooperation in 1957 and then Minister of Religious Affairs two years later dismayed many sections of the party. Sjaichu was a more able leader than his step-brother, though his aloof manner and reported collaboration with the Dutch in Surabaya during the Revolution hindered his acceptance within the party. He became leader of NU's parliamentary faction in 1957 and entered cabinet in 1963 as Deputy Speaker of the parliament.<br />
<br />
84 The main allegations concerned three companies in which Wahab and<br />
Wahib were involved: P.T. Sri Gula, a sugar marketing firm; C.V. Kurnia, putatively a rubber exporter; and P.T. Rahmat, a small sugar processing operation. Sri Gula endeavoured (apparently unsuccessfully) to gain a partial monopoly on domestic sugar sales and Kurnia obtained a special licence (lisensi istimewa) to export rubber slabs. Both companies were backed by Chinese capital leading to charges of them being 'Ali-Baha' enterprises (a reference to the practice of pribumi Indonesians fronting Chinese businesses). See, for example, Indonesia Raya, 11, 20 and 27July and 28 August 1956. Also interviews with Hamid Baidowi Jakarta, 12 July 1992 and Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 17 July 1992.<br />
<br />
85 According t, Aboebakar (PP 125-6) by the mid-1950s Wahab<br />
had Sixteen children.<br />
<br />
86 Abadi, 12 April 1957; Sin Po, 17 April 1957; and interview with KH<br />
Idham Chalid, Jakarta, 15 June 1992.<br />
<br />
87 Siaran ke-V, PBNU, 14 April 1957, pp. 4-5, Koleksi Nahdlatul Ulama,<br />
Arsip Nasional, Jakarta Selatan (hereafter refered to as AN), folder no.158.<br />
<br />
88 See Keputusan P.B. Sjuriah, 25 April 1960, reprinted in Laporan<br />
Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (Reports to the 1962 NU Congress<br />
in Solo), December 1962, lampiran 8, AN 3. For reports of the debate<br />
within the Syuriah see Mimbar Umum, 29 April 1960, and 21 and 24<br />
June 1960.<br />
<br />
89 'Putusan Sidang Pleno PBNU Tentang DPR-GR', 24 June 1960,<br />
Laporan Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, December 1962, lampiran<br />
9, AN 3.<br />
<br />
90 Laporan Fraksi NU, 1960, AN 260; and Mimbar Umum and Duta<br />
Masjarakat, 18 June 1960. The three nominees who refused to join the<br />
parliament were Z. Arifin Tanamas, Jusuf Hasjim and Mohammad Dachlan.<br />
<br />
91 The best example of this was NU's refusal in 1959 to support the return of the 1945 Constitution without the Jakarta Charter. Wahab had argued for passing the Constitution.<br />
<br />
92 Wahib's questionable business dealings and marriage to a non-Muslim<br />
Chinese woman in Singapore had been a constant source of controversy<br />
during his time as a minister. That Sukarno chose to demand his<br />
resignation in 1962 may well have been partly due to deteriorating<br />
relations between the two men. According to several sources, Wahib had clashed repeatedly with Sukarno during 1961 over the issue of PKI involvement in the cabinet. Interviews with Muhammad Madchan,<br />
Jombang, 8 December 1994; and Said Hilabi, Jakarta, 6 December 1994ยท<br />
See also, Duta Masjarakat, 19 March 1959, 6 January 1960 and 2, 3 and 9 November 1962.<br />
<br />
93 Saifuddin Zuhri writes candidly of Wahab's distress at his son's<br />
behaviour in Berangkat, pp. 492-5. Wahib was probably saved from<br />
serving a lengthy prison term by the intervention of Sukarno.<br />
<br />
94 Interviews with Chalid Mawardi, Jakarta, 14 August 1991; KH<br />
Moenasir, Mojosari, 14 September 1991; Said Budairy, Jakarta,<br />
30September 1991; KH Jusuf Hasjim, Jombang, 26 October 1991 and<br />
Jakarta, 14 July 1992.<br />
<br />
95 Subchan's suspension was overturned by the NU board shortly before<br />
the congress started. Interviews<br />
Asnawi Latief, Jakarta, 22 July<br />
May and 29 June1967; and Allan Samson, 'Islam and Politics in<br />
Indonesia', Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1972, p. 183.<br />
<br />
96 Aziz Masyhuri, p. 63; and interviews with Asnawi Latief, Jakarta, 25<br />
April and 22 July 1992; KH Jusuf Hasjim, Jakarta, 14 July 1992; Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 29 April 1992 and 22 July 1992; and Chalid Mawardi, Jakarta, 25 February 1992.<br />
<br />
97 Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 117; and Tempo, 8 January 1972.Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-39930757629956059892015-03-14T03:30:00.000+07:002015-03-14T03:30:01.257+07:00Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia. Next 2<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
took over role of chairman-general of the NU board for the<br />
remainder of the Occupation.50<br />
Following the declaration of Indonesian independence in<br />
August 1945, Sukarno appointed Wahab to the Supreme<br />
Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung). This was a<br />
prestigious position but one carrying little direct influence.51<br />
Wahab's appointment did, however, indicate that he was on<br />
good terms with, and trusted by, the President. With the onset of<br />
the Indonesian Revolution Wahab became involved in the<br />
guerilla movement against the returning Dutch forces. He raised<br />
money for military equipment, addressed guerilla units and<br />
helped coordinate the recruitment and training of santri in East<br />
Java.52<br />
<br />
Rais Am<br />
<br />
Following the death of Hasjim Asj'ari on 25 July 1947,<br />
Wahab Chasbullah, as the next most senior ulama within NU,<br />
assumed supreme leadership of the organisation. It was from this<br />
period until the early 1960s that, as rais am,53 he would<br />
dominate the organisation and greatly influence the course of its<br />
development.<br />
Before discussing his role as rais am it is necessary to<br />
examine first the internal dynamics and cleavages of NU from<br />
the late 1940s till the mid-1960s. Within NU's leadership during<br />
this period there existed what might best be termed two<br />
polarities: one of them hardline and the other pragmatic. NU<br />
leaders were orientated in various degrees towards one or other<br />
of these two 'poles' on the basis of ideology as well as ties of<br />
patronage or loyalty to a more senior kiai.<br />
The hardliners, in general, were those who favoured a firm<br />
adherence to both the letter and spirit of Islamic law. Their<br />
frame of reference was more scholastic and exclusively islamic<br />
than that of the pragmatists. They were strong supporters of the<br />
notion of an Islamic state and wanted formal recognition of the<br />
Syariah in the Indonesian Constitution. To this end they<br />
advocated the inclusion of the 1945 Jakarta Charter, which<br />
called for obligatory implementation of the Syariah for all<br />
Muslims, in the Constitution. They also placed a high value upon<br />
Islamic unity and argued that good relations with their co-<br />
religionists, whether modernist or traditionalist, should take<br />
precedence over relations with non-Muslims. An abiding anti-<br />
communism was especially evident. Other attitudes which<br />
characterised the hardliners included a disdain of politicking and<br />
its associated deal-making and compromise, a tendency towards<br />
conservatism on matters of social change, and a less syncretic<br />
approach to Islamic devotional practice. The dominant figure<br />
amongst the hardliners was Bisri Syansuri though others, such as<br />
KH Achmad Siddiq, KH Mohammad Dachlan and KH Machrus<br />
All, were also significant at various times.<br />
The pragmatic stream, by contrast, displayed a less<br />
doctrinaire approach to policy and action. Its interpretation of<br />
Islamic law was more liberal and realist than that of the<br />
hardliners, with preference frequently given to general<br />
jurisprudential maxims and precepts over more specific legal<br />
interdictions.54 Among the most commonly used precepts were<br />
amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (enjoining good and preventing evil),<br />
maslahah and mafsadah (respectively, the pursuit of benefit and<br />
avoidance of harm), and akhaffud-dararain (in essence,<br />
choosing the lesser of two risks). There is much debate amongst<br />
Muslim scholars about the meaning and realisation of these<br />
precepts but in the hands of NU's pragmatists, they became a<br />
prescription for political flexibility and expedience. In policy<br />
terms the pragmatists were more cautious on the Islamic state<br />
issue because of concerns about alienating non-Muslim<br />
Indonesians and doubts that it would necessarily result in a more<br />
Islamic society. They were also far less concerned about<br />
maintaining solidarity with modernist Muslims, and indeed, often<br />
regarded the latter as rivals for the leadership of the umat. On<br />
many issues, they were closer to the nationalists, particularly<br />
those of more moderate persuasion, than to modernist Muslims,<br />
and their attitudes towards left-wing groups tended to be more<br />
tolerant.<br />
Wahab Chasbullah was the pre-eminent Pragmatist in NU's<br />
leadership. This was especially evident in his political outlook.<br />
He had little interest in elaborate or abstract political theories;<br />
politics, for him, was ultimately about the pursuit and use of<br />
power. He believed the best way for NU to protect and advance<br />
the interests of Islam and the community of believers was to<br />
secure a share of political power. In post-independence<br />
Indonesia, this effectively meant having influence within the<br />
government and legislature. The greater the number of NU<br />
ministers, bureaucrats and members of parliament, the better the<br />
organisation would be able to realise its aspirations. Wahab's<br />
views were strongly supported by many of NU's more<br />
politically-inclined leaders including Zainul Arifin, Masjkur,<br />
Idham Chalid and Saifuddin Zuhri.<br />
Despite this bipolarity within NU's leadership, the<br />
organisation's internal dynamics were remarkably fluid because<br />
of a strong preference for decision-making by consensus rather<br />
than voting. For either the hardliners or pragmatists to win on<br />
any given issue, they needed to attract the support of those<br />
board members who lacked a strong a priori commitment to a<br />
particular view. Usually, once a clear majority had been<br />
persuaded towards a certain position, the remainder of the<br />
leadership would relent without forcing a ballot. During the<br />
period in question it was Wahab and the pragmatists who were<br />
most frequently ascendant.<br />
In examining Wahab's influence Upon NU's political<br />
behaviour, particular attention will be paid to four critical<br />
events: NU's secession from Masyumi in 1952; its decision to<br />
enter the cabinets of Ali Sastroamidjojo in 1953 and Djuanda tie.<br />
Kabinet Karya) in 1957; and lastly, the decision to participate in<br />
the Gotong-Royong Parliament In 1960. In all of these issues<br />
tensions between the hardline and pragmatic elements were<br />
evident.<br />
<br />
Secession<br />
<br />
Nahdlatul Ulama's separation from Masyumi was the greatest<br />
upheaval in Islamic politics of the early 1950s. Since the latter<br />
part of the 1930s there had been substantial cooperation<br />
between modernist and traditionalist organisations, firstly<br />
through MIAI, and later, from 1943, through Masyumi. The<br />
subsequent re-emergence of animosity between the two streams<br />
had long-term consequences for the dynamics of Indonesian<br />
politics. Aspects of the secession will be examined in some detail<br />
as they reveal much about Wahab's influence on events, his<br />
leadership style, and his outlook.<br />
The origins of the NU-Masyumi split can be traced to the<br />
1949 Masyumi congress in Yogyakarta. A new generation of<br />
modernists under the leadership Mohammad Natsir won control<br />
of the Masyumi board and the party's rules were changed to limit<br />
the influence of the Majlis Syuro (Religious Advisory Council)<br />
which was chaired by Wahab Chasbullah and dominated by NU<br />
ulama. The political competence of traditionalist kiai was also<br />
ridiculed by modernist speakers leading to a walkout by NU<br />
delegates.55 Such was the anger at the perceived anti-<br />
traditionalist trend within Masyumi that at the next NU<br />
congress, held in Jakarta in April 1950, sections of the<br />
organisation proposed that it withdraw from the party.<br />
Foremost among the pro-secessionists was Wahab, who<br />
viewed Masyumi's actions as not only an attempt to marginalise<br />
NU, but also a personal affront to his authority as chairman of<br />
the Majlis Syuro. As in the 1920s he set about rallying<br />
traditionalist Muslims to confront the modernist challenge. He<br />
told NU delegates that if Masyumi was unwilling to agree to a<br />
more equitable share of power between the party's main member<br />
organisations and restore the powers of the Majlis Syuro, then<br />
NU should disaffiliate and establish its own political party. He<br />
was sanguine about NU's prospects outside Masyumi, and in a<br />
typically blunt and hortatory address to the NU congress, his<br />
first as rais am, he reproached colleagues who expressed<br />
misgivings about secession.<br />
<br />
There are many NU leaders in the provinces and also in<br />
the centre who are not convinced of NU's strength; they are<br />
more convinced of the power of other groups. These people<br />
are influenced by the whispers of other people who spread<br />
propaganda... NU's strength is like a cannon... [Yet] that<br />
propaganda makes the hearts [of NU leaders] shake as if their<br />
weapon is not a cannon, but only...a gelugu or coconut<br />
branch acting as a fake cannon...! The foolish (tolol) NU<br />
leaders aren't aware that this is the tactic of opponents to<br />
bring down NU by means of making its leaders doubtful d<br />
their own power.56<br />
<br />
Despite support for the secession proposal, no formal<br />
decision was taken on the matter. The NU leadership was,<br />
however, instructed to negotiate with Masyumi regarding<br />
organisational reform of the party.57 Tensions continued to<br />
simmer over the next two years as the Masyumi board<br />
repeatedly rejected NU's demands.<br />
It was the refusal of the Masyumi board in February 1952 to<br />
nominate an NU member to the new cabinet which brought NU<br />
to the brink of disaffiliation.58 NU had expected to retain the<br />
Religious Affairs portfolio, a position it had held in the last two<br />
cabinets. Loss of this department, which had become NU's only<br />
stronghold in the bureaucracy and an important source of<br />
patronage, would have been a major blow.<br />
There was widespread anger and disillusionment within the<br />
organisation over Masyumi's actions. Wahab was especially<br />
incensed and resolved that if the Masyumi board could not be<br />
forced to back down and endorse an NU nominee to the ministry<br />
then NU would split from the party. From late February until<br />
early May he conducted an audacious campaign to achieve this<br />
end. His demands were served upon the Masyumi board in a series<br />
of three personal letters sent between 8 and 20 March. In the<br />
first of these he demanded, without the knowledge or approval<br />
of the NU board, the Religious Affairs and Defence portfolios<br />
for NU.59 He also released the letter to the press, thereby<br />
gravely undermining Masyumi's position in the delicately<br />
balanced negotiations over cabinet posts.60 His actions infuriated<br />
the Masyumi board.<br />
In his second letter, on 15 March, Wahab called for President<br />
Sukarno to be directly involved in the allocation of portfolios<br />
and vented, in notably forthright terms, his own displeasure at<br />
being excluded from day-to-day political decision-making within<br />
Masyumi. He complained about 'various doors being jammed<br />
shut', and gave notice that he would 'pound on them' to test if<br />
they would open. His closing sentence stated: 'As a final<br />
warning, if it is evident that my pounding continues unheeded,<br />
then believe me, we will both soon see what happens'.61 In the<br />
final letter he gave Masyumi a two-day deadline to reverse their<br />
decision before NU would reconsider its membership of the<br />
party. This letter was accompanied by a statement from the NU<br />
board formally supporting, for the first time, Wahab's actions.62<br />
Aside from his correspondence with Masyumi he also met and<br />
canvassed NU's options with other political leaders, the most<br />
notable of whom was President Sukarno who shared Wahab's<br />
strong dislike for the Natsir group.63<br />
The breakdown in NU-Masyumi relations entered a terminal<br />
phase in late March. At a meeting with the Masyumi board on<br />
23 March Wahab declared that his demands were an 'absolute<br />
condition' for any further negotiation and 'NU would struggle by<br />
itself if they were not acceded to. The board, irked by Wahab's<br />
ultimatums and politicking, rejected his conditions. He responded<br />
by immediately disclosing his correspondence and failed<br />
negotiations with Masyumi to the cabinet formateur, PNI's<br />
Wilopo, in the vain hope of securing the last-minute inclusion of<br />
an NU member. After learning of his actions an exasperated<br />
Masyumi board formally nominated Muhammadiyah's Fakih<br />
Usman as Minister of Religious Affairs on 26 March.64<br />
Having brought NU to the threshold of secession Wahab and<br />
his supporters still faced the task of convincing the organisation<br />
to take the next step and transform itself into an independent<br />
political party. Despite widespread anti-1Masyumi sentiment<br />
within NU, many members were apprehensive about being seen<br />
to divide the umat. There was also concern about NU's potential<br />
to be a viable party given its ramshackle organisational structure<br />
and lack of cadre with sufficient educational and administrative<br />
experience. Wahab displayed no such doubts. For example, when<br />
a Masyumi leader asked sarcastically how many lawyers,<br />
engineers and doctors there were within NU, he replied in typical<br />
homespun fashion:<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> If I buy a new car the salesman doesn't ask 'Sir, can you<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>drive?' Such a question is unnecessary because if I can't<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>drive a car I can post an advertisement: 'Driver Wanted'.<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Without doubt there will soon be a queue of candidates in<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>front of my door.65<br />
<br />
In other words, once NU had its own political vehicle, the<br />
necessary expert personnel could be hired or coopted.<br />
The final decision regarding disaffiliation was taken at the NU<br />
congress in Palembang which began on 26 April 1952. There was<br />
heated debate on the issue with a vocal minority of delegates<br />
resisting the board's attempts to achieve unanimous approval for<br />
departing from Masyumi.66 According to an eye-witness account,<br />
at one point in the debate several leaders appeared to be<br />
wavering in their resolve so Wahab took the podium and<br />
declared:<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> If you really doubt the stand we are taking, you are<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>welcome to continue within Masyumi. Let me lead NU by<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>myself as a political party separate from Masyumi. I only<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>ask to be accompanied by just one young person---one is<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>enough--as my secretary. Later you will see [what<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>happens].67<br />
<br />
Eventually the congress agreed to a formula which resulted in<br />
NU's official withdrawal from Masyumi on 1 August 1952.68 At<br />
the end of that month NU effectively became a political party<br />
by joining with two smaller parties--Perti and Partai Sarekat<br />
Islam Indonesia--to form the Liga Muslimin Indonesia, a loose<br />
(and largely ineffectual) federation designed to counterbalance<br />
Masyumi.<br />
NU's estrangement and eventual departure from Masyumi<br />
offers one of the best documented episodes in Wahab's career.<br />
The picture which emerges is that of a man totally convinced of<br />
the correctness of his views and prepared to adopt an 'end-<br />
justifies-the-means' approach to achieve them. He wielded his<br />
authority as rais am and NU co-founder to the full, often<br />
behaving in an autocratic and pre-emptive manner but also<br />
displaying considerable political savvy. It was these qualities and<br />
his penchant for brinksmanship which led many modernists to<br />
blame him for the rupture between NU and Masyumi. It would,<br />
however, be more accurate to describe Wahab's role as catalytic<br />
rather than causal. Had there not been a substantial groundswell<br />
of resentment against Masyumi into which he could tap, Wahab<br />
would never have been able to marshal majority support for<br />
secession.<br />
<br />
Party Consolidation and Personal Triumph<br />
<br />
The period between 1952 and 1955 was one of rapid<br />
expansion and consolidation for the new party. Having<br />
committed itself to political activity much now depended on<br />
attaining a significant share of the vote at Indonesia's first<br />
general election which was scheduled for September 1955. NU<br />
had boasted that some seventy per cent of Masyumi members<br />
were either NU members or sympathisers; it now had to attract<br />
their support.69<br />
The three years following NU's secession were hectic for<br />
Wahab. Having played a pivotal role in NU becoming a party his<br />
own credibility was now tied to the success of NU's political<br />
venture. His responsibilities were numerous. As rais am he had to<br />
oversee the organisation's development and policy<br />
formulation.70 He began travelling regularly around the<br />
contryside mobilising support and building up the organisation's<br />
branch structure and financial base.71 As a senior member of<br />
NU's parliamentary fraction, he also figured prominently in<br />
determining party tactics and responses to pending legislation as<br />
well as negotiating with other party leaders.<br />
In addition to this, he became an increasingly important link<br />
between the President and NU. The two had enjoyed warm<br />
personal relations since at least the early 1940s. Apart from<br />
their shared experience of Surabayan life in the 1910s and<br />
1920s, Wahab and Sukarno had many interests in common,<br />
including politics, international affairs, Javanese culture and a<br />
fascination with attractive women. After Sukarno's elevation to<br />
the presidency in 1945, Wahab became a regular visitor to the<br />
palace. His quick, earthy humour and forthright counsel on<br />
political and religious issues were, by all accounts, welcomed by<br />
Sukarno.72 With NU's emergence as an independent party the<br />
mutual benefits of close Presidential-NU relations would have<br />
been evident to both men. Sukarno sought to promote NU as a<br />
moderate Islamic alternative to Masyumi while Wahab hoped<br />
the President's support would bolster his party's prospects in a<br />
highly competitive political system. Wahab's great admiration<br />
for Sukarno's leadership qualities must also have influenced his<br />
behaviour. He believed that NU should support the President not<br />
only because of his key role in achieving Indonesia's<br />
independence but also because he remained a crucial figure in<br />
maintaining and developing a sense of national unity and<br />
purpose.73<br />
In the middle of 1953, NU faced a new crisis in its relations<br />
with Masyumi, again over cabinet positions. The resignation of<br />
the Wilopo government in early June led to almost two months<br />
of protracted and intense discussions between various parties<br />
over the composition of a new cabinet. NU's preferred option<br />
was for a 'United Front' cabinet containing both PNI and<br />
Masyumi. Opinion within NU was divided, though, on how to<br />
proceed if these two parties refused to coalesce. The more<br />
hardline NU leaders were committed to maintaining solidarity<br />
with their fellow Muslims in Masyumi whilst the pragmatists,<br />
who remained mistrustful of that party's modernist leadership,<br />
were prepared to enter a non-Masyumi coalition with the PNI<br />
and smaller nationalist and Christian parties. Neither side<br />
commanded a majority in its own right and relied on attracting<br />
support from the sizeable 'undecided' element within the party's<br />
leadership.<br />
Initially NU aligned itself with Masyumi in the maneuvering<br />
for portfolios on the understanding that it would receive the<br />
Religious Affairs Ministry. When, however, in late July<br />
discussions between Masyumi and PNI again broke down NU<br />
began dealing directly with the formateur over positions in a<br />
non-Masyumi cabinet. President Sukarno was widely believed to<br />
have intervened in the ensuing negotiations urging NU and other<br />
smaller parties to join.74 On 30 July NU finally accepted an offer<br />
of three portfolios--those of Second Deputy Prime Minister,<br />
Religious Affairs and Agriculture--in a new cabinet to be led by<br />
PNI's Ali Sastroamidjojo. Its decision was bitterly criticised by<br />
Masyumi leaders who claimed to have received an undertaking<br />
from NU not to break ranks with their party.75<br />
Although much of the internal politics regarding NU's<br />
decision to enter the Ali cabinet remains obscure, Wahab seems<br />
once again to have played a critical role. In the final meetings of<br />
the NU leadership to consider the party's stance on the cabinet<br />
Wahab reportedly argued emphatically for participation.76 The<br />
case put by him and his fellow pragmatists was based mainly on<br />
the jurisprudential precepts of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and<br />
maslahah. According to this line of argument participation was<br />
justified in order, firstly, to prevent harm to the nation and its<br />
political system by breaking the long impasse in forming a new<br />
government and, secondly, to secure benefit for NU and its<br />
Muslim constituency. Regarding the latter point it was asserted<br />
that as the second largest party in government NU's ministers<br />
would be able to implement many of the party's policies and also<br />
enhance its prospects at the next election.77 This view was<br />
eventually accepted though an undertaking had to be given to<br />
hardliners that NU backing would be withdrawn if the cabinet's<br />
performance proved unsatisfactory.<br />
<br />
<br />
********<br />
<br />
50 Anam, p. 123.<br />
<br />
51 Parlaungan, p. 214.<br />
<br />
52 Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 50; and interview with Hasjim Latief, Sepanjang, 11September 1991.<br />
<br />
53 Whereas Hasjim Asj'ari had been referred to as the rais akbar, Wahab, out of deference to his predecessor and teacher took the somewhat humbler title of rais am.<br />
<br />
54 I am indebted to Kiai Muchith Muzadi, Ali Haidar and Martin van<br />
Bruinessen for their helpful comments on differing approaches to<br />
jurisprudence within NU.<br />
<br />
55 See Idham Chalid's account in Amak Fadhali (ed.), Partai N. U. dengan Aqidah dan Perkembangannja, Tohaputra, Semarang, 1969. p. 27.<br />
<br />
56 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat, p. 390.<br />
<br />
57 Saifuddin Zuhri, Kaleidoskop di Indonesia, vol. 3, Gunung<br />
Agung, Jakarta, 1981, p. 213.<br />
<br />
58 The Masyumi board's intention was to nominate a Muhammadiyah<br />
member as Minister of Religious Affairs. This followed considerable<br />
criticism of how previous NU Ministers had handled the portfolio. The board believed that Muhammadiyah not only had superior candidates to those proposed by NU but was also entitled to demand that such an important ministry for Muslims be rotated amongst the major Islamic organisations.<br />
<br />
59 The Political Advisory Council of the NU board was forced to issue a<br />
press statement claiming that Wahab's actions were a personal initiative and had not been discussed at a board level. Berita Indonesia, 8 March 1952; and Abadi, 10 March 1952. Wahab had also, without prior consultation, renominated Wahid Hasjim, the incumbent Minister of Religious Affairs (and his nephew by marriage). despite<br />
Wahid's firm refusal to stand again. Interviews with Solechah Hasyim<br />
Wahid Hasjim's widow), Jakarta, 19 November 1991 and Hamid<br />
Baidowi, Jakarta, 26 April 1992.<br />
<br />
60 Buku Putih, DPP Masyumi, Jakarta, 1952, pp. 11-12.<br />
<br />
61 Reproduced in Buku Putih, pp. 20-1.<br />
<br />
62 Buku Putih, pp. 26-8.<br />
<br />
63 Berita Indonesia, 1 March 1952; and Buku Putih, p. 6.<br />
<br />
64 Buku Putih, pp. 29-32. Wahab's meeting with Wilopo also unsettled<br />
his colleagues. Wahid Hasjim wrote a personal note to Natsir regretfully informing him of his uncle's actions. His note is reprinted in ibid. p. 31-2.<br />
<br />
65 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat, p. 399.<br />
<br />
66 Wahab had earlier locked a reluctant NU board into accepting, in<br />
principle, secession from Masyumi and presenting this to congress for ratification. This made it far more difficult for the anti- secessionists as a failure to confirm the board's decision would be taken as repudiation of the organisation's leadership. This tactic of 'raising the stakes' for his opponents was employed on numerous occasions by Wahab during his term as rais am. Pikiran Rakjat, 8 April 1952; Haluan, 9 April 1952; and interview with KH Muchith Muzadi, Jember, 2 July 1992.<br />
<br />
67 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat, p. 398.<br />
<br />
68 According to several delegates at the congress, Wahab's speech failed to persuade a number of influential anti-secessionists. A compromise formula involving the establishment of a committee to negotiate with the Masyumi board over the terms of separation was only able to be struck after the intervention of Wahid Hasjim. Interviews with Nuddin Lubis, Jakarta, 17 July 1992 and KH Muslich, Jakarta, 26 September 1991.<br />
<br />
69 See the comments of Mohammad Dachlan in Pikiran Rakjat, 5 April<br />
1952.<br />
<br />
70 Until his death in April 1953, Wahid Hasjim, as deputy chairman of the NU board, directly managed much of the administrative and policy work for the party. His untimely demise in a car accident robbed NU of one of its most gifted and competent leaders.<br />
<br />
71 Amak Fadhali, PP 28-30; and interview with Idham Chalid, Jakarta, 15<br />
2999 1992. According to Idham, he and Wahab spent most weekends<br />
from mid-1952 to 1954 visiting NU branches and pesantren.<br />
<br />
72 Interviews with Solechah Hasyim, Jakarta, 19 November 1991; Hasib<br />
Wahab, Jombang, 28 October 1991; Hamid Baidowi, Jakarta, 17 July<br />
1992; and Ruslan Abdulgani, Jakarta 20 July 1992.<br />
<br />
73 Interviews with KH Muslich, Jakarta, 26 September 1991; KH<br />
Nasrulloh, Jombang, 29 October 1991; and KH Jusuf Hasjim, Jakarta, 14 July 1992.<br />
<br />
74 This was not the first time NU had entered into direct cabinet<br />
negotiations following Masyumi's withdrawal. In the fourth week of<br />
negotiations it appeared on the verge of agreeing to a Ministry in a<br />
proposed non-Masyumi cabinet but withdrew when several other parties<br />
expressed reservations. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional<br />
Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1962, pp.<br />
333-4. <br />
<br />
75 Deliar Noer, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Nasional, Grafiti Pers,<br />
Jakarta, 1987, p. 235; and Abadi, 31 July and 3 August 1952. This claim is problematic. Noer provides no details of who gave the undertaking and there appear to be no surviving documents, official or otherwise, Which refer to it. More importantly, NU had demonstrated five weeks beforehand that it would consider participating in a non-Masyumi cabinet, so it would seem surprising if the Masyumi leadership withdrew from cabinet negotiations on the basis of this 'undertaking', as Noer asserts.<br />
<br />
76 Noer, Partai Islam, p. 235; and field notes of Dr Herbert Feith.<br />
<br />
77 The statement of the NU board, reprinted in Merdeka, 12 September<br />
1953, declared that the principle of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and<br />
Calculation of maslahah and mafsadah obliged NU to join the new<br />
cabinet, albeit without Masyumi. See also the comments of Zainul Arifin and Nur A.G.N. in Abadi, 3 and 4 August 1953; and interviews with Idham Chalid by Dien Madjid, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta Selatan, tape no.18.Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-39621274914657222652015-03-11T12:30:00.000+07:002015-03-11T12:30:01.776+07:00Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia. Next 1<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />
delegation to the Cairo congress.30 The delegation was cancelled<br />
however, when the Cairo congress was postponed.<br />
Arrangements for the second world congress in Mecca proved<br />
to be far more divisive. Whilst traditionalist Muslims feared that<br />
Ibn Saud would restrict Syafi'i rituals and education in the Hijaz<br />
modernists generally welcomed his coming to power.31 At the<br />
1925 Al-Islam Congress in Yogyakarta traditionalist delegates<br />
were angered by the dismissive modernist attitude towards<br />
Wahab's proposal that Ibn Saud be required to guarantee religious<br />
freedom for all Muslims in Mecca. In early January 1926, a<br />
conference of modernist leaders in Cianjur, West Java, proposed<br />
another delegation to Mecca, but invited no traditionalists to<br />
participate.32<br />
These events convinced many kiai of the necessity for<br />
separate traditionalist initiatives to ensure their religious views<br />
and interests would be represented. In mid-January 1926 Wahab<br />
with the approval of Hasjim Asj'ari, invited leading traditionalist<br />
ulama to endorse the foundation of a committee called Komite<br />
Hijaz (Hijaz Committee) which would dispatch a delegation to<br />
Mecca to represent traditionalist interests. On 31 January 1926,<br />
15 ulama gathered at Wahab's Surabaya house and ratified the<br />
committee's formation. They furthermore decided to establish<br />
immediately a permanent organisation to represent traditionalist<br />
Islam. This new body was called Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the<br />
Religious Scholars). Hasjim Asj'ari was chosen as rais akbar<br />
(Supreme President), Achmad Dachlan Kebondalem was<br />
appointed as his deputy, and Wahab filled the third most senior<br />
position of katib (secretary) to the Syuriah (Religious Council).33<br />
The respective roles of Wahab Chasbullah and Hasjim Asj'ari<br />
in NU's formation warrant close examination. There is<br />
considerable evidence indicating that Wahab was the main<br />
driving force behind the establishment of NU. According to<br />
some accounts he had, as early as 1924, proposed that an 'ulama<br />
association' be formed to provide a more coordinated and<br />
sustained response to modernist encroachment.34 It was an<br />
initiative aimed at bringing modernist-style organisational<br />
methods to a community more used to defending the<br />
individuality of ulama and the autonomy of pesantren. Although<br />
favourably received by some kiai the proposal foundered when<br />
Hasjim Asj'ari failed to give his approval.35 His refusal was<br />
probably motivated by a reluctance to sanction any new<br />
organisation which might further divide the umat or distract<br />
ulama from their religious duties.36 Without the support of<br />
Hasjim Asj'ari, the most respected ulama in Java, Wahab stood<br />
little chance of success. As an ulama he did not yet possess<br />
sufficient stature to attract senior kiai and their followers to the<br />
organisation. It would also have been difficult for him to proceed<br />
without the blessing of his own teacher.37 But with the apparent<br />
preparedness of modernists to act unilaterally from late 1925<br />
Hasjim Asj'ari's opposition to a separate traditionalist<br />
organisation lessened and his backing was eventually given to the<br />
initiative.38 The success of the founding meeting of NU in<br />
January 1926 was assured once Hasjim Asj'ari's imprimatur had<br />
been obtained. It is thus apparent both Wahab Chasbullah and<br />
Hasjim Asj'ari played distinct but mutually indispensable roles in<br />
the successful formation of NU. Wahab provided the concept<br />
and organisational skill and Hasjim Asj'ari the religious<br />
legitimacy.<br />
By this period, the character and direction of Wahab<br />
Chasbullah's life was clearly defined. He possessed a diversity of<br />
talents and interests ranging from education and business to<br />
politics, international affairs and contemporary social issues. His<br />
gift for organisation and leadership was apparent as also was his<br />
great energy and persistence. Most importantly, he was a<br />
resourceful and determined defender of traditional Islam and the<br />
authority of ulama.<br />
The hostility between the traditionalist and reformist groups<br />
in Indonesian Islam peaked during the late 1920s and early<br />
1930s as organisations representing each stream engaged in an<br />
increasingly acrimonious battle for the allegiance of Muslims.<br />
NU adopted many of the methods of its modernist rivals,<br />
producing its own journals and promotional pamphlets,<br />
sponsoring public meetings and debates, recruiting members and<br />
opening new branches.<br />
Wahab worked indefatigably during this period. He was in<br />
heavy demand as a speaker, and also acted as editor and major<br />
fund-raiser for NU's early publishing endeavours, including the<br />
organisation's first magazine, Swara Nahdlatoel 'Oelama. He<br />
also travelled widely throughout Java recruiting ulama and cadre<br />
to the organisation.39 His endeavours to secure guarantees of<br />
religious freedom for non-Hanbali Muslims in the Hijaz<br />
culminated in 1928 when he led a two-man mission to Mecca.40<br />
In a meeting with Ibn Saud he gained certain assurances of non-<br />
discrimination against traditionalist activities in the Holy City.<br />
The apparent success of the delegation not only bolstered<br />
Wahab's standing in the traditionalist umat but also pointed to<br />
the benefits of having effective organisation.41 Most of the<br />
funds for the journey had been raised within NU and the<br />
delegation's credibility was enhanced by the fact that it<br />
represented a Permanent grouping of eminent Javanese<br />
traditionalist ulama.<br />
Apart from his activities within NU, Wahab remained busy in<br />
other fields as well. Upon the death of his father in 1926 he had<br />
assumed leadership of the family pesantren at Tambakberas but<br />
continued to spend most of his time in Surabaya.42 His business<br />
activities, particularly as a hajj agent and sugar and rice trader<br />
grew in size and prosperity. By the early 1930s he had also<br />
become increasingly involved in legal matters working as a<br />
pokrol bambu (bush lawyer) and advokat (barrister).43<br />
Combining his debating prowess with a self-taught knowledge of<br />
Dutch civil law, he soon gained a reputation in East Java's<br />
Muslim community as a highly effective legal adviser and<br />
barrister.44<br />
His colourful personal life also won him a certain celebrity<br />
Wahab had married at least nine times by the early 1930s.<br />
resulting in six children and much gossip in political and<br />
pesantren circles about his ever-changing marital<br />
circumstances.45 He was one of the few Muslims ill Surabaya to<br />
own a large American car and later attracted further attention<br />
when he purchased a powerful Harley-Davidson motorcycle. He<br />
became a familiar but nonetheless striking sight riding his<br />
motorbike at high speed around the countryside dressed in his<br />
customary sarong, jacket and white turban.46 In the world of<br />
traditional ulama where idiosyncrasy was often seen as a virtue<br />
Wahab had much to recommend him.<br />
<br />
Conciliatory Period<br />
<br />
Relations between modernist and traditionalist Muslims began<br />
to improve from the mid-1930s. This was partly in response to<br />
articles in the Christian press and colonial government<br />
legislation which were seen as anti-Islamic, as well as a growing<br />
realisation within the umat of the deleterious effects of<br />
internecine squabbling.<br />
This new spirit of reconciliation was reflected in Wahab's<br />
own endeavours. In September 1937 he played a central role in<br />
the formation of MIAI (Majlis Islam A'laa Indonesia or Supreme<br />
Council of Indonesian Muslims), a federal body intended to<br />
improve cooperation between Muslim organisations. The initial<br />
meeting which led to MIAI's founding was held in Wahab's<br />
Surabaya house, and was attended by his NU colleague Achmad<br />
Dachlan of Kebondalem (not Mohammad Dachlan, as stated in<br />
some books), Mas Mansoer representing Muhammadiyah, and<br />
W. Wondoamiseno from SI.47 Both Wahab and Dachlan took up<br />
positions on the MIAI Secretariat, though from 1941 Wahid<br />
Hasjim and Machfoezh Shiddiq were NU's chief representatives.<br />
During Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies,<br />
Wahab, like many ulama, accepted positions within the<br />
government. He was appointed to the Shu Sangi Kai or Regional<br />
Advisory Council in Surabaya in 1943 and in the same year was<br />
also involved in negotiations over the creation of the Japanese-<br />
sponsored Islamic organisation, Masyumi, to which he was made<br />
a special adviser.48 When Hasjim Asj'ari, Machfoezh Siddiq and<br />
several other NU leaders were jailed for defying Japanese<br />
instructions, Wahab led the successful campaign to win their<br />
release.49 Upon the death of Machfoezh Siddiq in June 1944 he<br />
<br />
********<br />
<br />
30 Noer, pp. 222-3; and Abdurrahman Wahid, p. 24. The other members of<br />
the delegation were Haji Fachroeddin from Muhammadiyah and<br />
Surjopranoto representing Sarekat Islam.<br />
<br />
31 Noer, pp. 222-3; and Abdurrahman Wahid, p. 24. The Wahabbis adhered<br />
to the Hanbali legal code, regarded by the Syafi'ite Indonesians as the most puritanical of the four Sunni law schools. Indonesian<br />
traditionalists had been alarmed by reports that Ibn Saud had closed<br />
some non-Hanbali classes and allowed the desecration of saints' grave sites which had been popular places of prayer for Syafi'i Muslims.<br />
<br />
32 H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto from SI and Mas Mansoer from Muhammadiyah<br />
were appointed as delegates. This delegation was then affirmed at the Al-Islam Congress at Bandung in February 1926. The traditionalist demands for religious freedom were also rejected by the Bandung congress. Wahab was unable to attend due to the death of his father. Anam, p. 52; and Noer, p. 223.<br />
<br />
33 Aboebakar, pp.471-72; Anam, pp.51 and 54; and Noer, p.223.<br />
<br />
34 This proposal apparently followed the success of special courses<br />
organised by Wahab at Nahdlatul Wathan in 1924 called 'Masail<br />
Diniah' (Religious Problems), which were intended to train senior<br />
santri and ulama to defend traditional Sunni practices and rebut the<br />
attacks of the modernists. Some 65 santri and ulama are said to have<br />
completed the course. See Abdul Halim, section Vt (Perjalanan Kaki);<br />
and Anam, p. 29.<br />
<br />
35 Anam, p. 30.<br />
<br />
36 An indication of Hasjim Asj'ari's thinking can be found in<br />
Abdurrahman Wahid, p. 26.<br />
<br />
37 According to one source, Wahab and several colleagues continued<br />
quietly to develop the idea of an ulama organisation despite Hasjim<br />
Asj'ari's attitude, even to the point of drawing up a draft constitution and rules. This eventually became the framework for the first NU constitution. Anam, p.69.<br />
<br />
38 Despite this, Hasjim Asj'ari still seemed a reluctant patron. According to both Aziz Masyhuri (pp.131-32) and Abdurrahman Wahid (p.27). Hasjim Asj'ari was not initially present at the 31 January meeting and could only be persuaded to attend after Wahab dispatched Bisri Syansuri to Jombang to escort him to Surabaya. No other source<br />
mentions this.<br />
<br />
39 Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p.37; and Anam, p.78.<br />
<br />
40 This was the Komite's second attempt to send a delegation to the<br />
Middle-East. The first delegation led by KH R. Asnawi (Kudus) failed to depart, so telegrams were sent instead. The lack of a reply to these led to the second delegation. Wahab was accompanied on the mission by a Surabaya-based Egyptian teacher, Syekh Abdullah Ghanaim al-Amir. Anam, pp.71_74; and Noer, p.224.<br />
<br />
41 According to the NU journal, Swara Nahdlateol 'Oelama, some 3000<br />
people attended the meeting at the Ampel Mosque in Surabaya at which<br />
Wahab announced the results of his delegation to Mecca. See Anam,<br />
p.74, n.89. The success and even necessity for the mission is a matter of debate. Ibn Saud's assurances to Wahab carried the qualification that only practices in keeping with the scriptures would be allowed. (The delegation's letter to Ibn Saud and his written response are reprinted in Anam, lampiran 1-7). Many modernists also believed that lbn Saud had already promised not to interfere in most traditionalist activities so there was little to be gained from sending a delegation. See also Noer, pp.223-24.<br />
<br />
42 Wahab would usually visit Tambakberas for several days each month to<br />
attend to pesantren affairs. He seldom taught there but frequently<br />
Supervised pencak silat contests amongst the santri. Interviews with<br />
KH Djalil, Balu, Jombang, 28 June 1992, and Zaini and Ridlwan<br />
Dachlan, Jombang, 7 December 1994.<br />
<br />
43 A pokrol bambu provided advice about secular law to poorer pribumis<br />
(native Indonesians) and often served as a mediator in disputes between Dutch authorities and Indonesians. An advokat would represent client in civil court cases. It was not unusual for lower and middle-clasi Muslims to retain lay barristers tie. those with legal expertise but no formal qualifications) to handle their cases.<br />
<br />
44 Interviews with Muhammad Madchan and Zaini Dachlan, Jombang.<br />
8 December 1994<br />
<br />
45 In keeping with Islamic law, Wahab never had more than four wives at<br />
any given time. Although it was not unusual for well-to-do Muslim men to have several wives, Wahab practised serial polygyny on a scale that had few rivals. No-one, including his own family, seems certain of the total number of times he married, though some well- informed sources believe it could have been in excess of twenty. As was common for kiai many of these marriages would seem to have been strategic. Four of his first ten wives were the daughters of other kiai, several of whom possessed considerable wealth. At least two of his other wives were members of prosperous Muslim trading families in East Java. A list of his first thirteen wives is provided in Aboebakar, pp. 125-6.<br />
<br />
46 Interviews with Hasyim Latief. Sepanjang, 23 October 1991; Hasib<br />
Wahab, Jombang, 28 October 1991; and Muhammad Madchan, Jombang<br />
8 December 1994.<br />
<br />
47 Boekoe Peringatan MIAI, 1937-1941, Secretariaat MIAI, Surabaya,<br />
1941, pp. 2-3; and Noer, p. 242.<br />
<br />
48 Parlaungan, p. 215; and Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising<br />
Sun, KITLV Leiden, 1983, pp. 262-3, n. 6.<br />
<br />
49 Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 46.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-16769248042773174682015-03-10T13:16:00.003+07:002015-03-10T13:16:58.739+07:00Philosophy #13"I have been driven many times upon my knees by the overwhelming conviction that I had no where else to go." #Abraham LincolnHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-34810355064021891622015-03-08T08:00:00.000+07:002015-03-08T08:00:01.028+07:00Traditional Islam and Modernity Of Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama. Chapter One<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Chapter One</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
KH. Wahab Chasbullah,</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Traditionalism and the Political Development of Nahdlatul Ulama</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Greg Fealy</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
There have been few more controversial ulama (religious scholars) in modern Indonesian history than Wahab Chasbullah.1 </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
During a half century of prominence Islamic affairs his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
actions aroused strong emotions ranging from veneration to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
contempt. For his followers he was an inspirational and dynamic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
ulama who gave resolute leadership to the traditionalist Muslim</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
community in times of crisis.2 The more devoted of his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
supporters regarded him as a wali (saint), an ulama besar</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(eminent religious scholar) and bapak rohani (spiritual father).</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
For his detractors he epitomised some of the worst aspects of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
traditional ulama-hood; he was seen as authoritarian, self-serving, </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
casuistical, politically naive and corrupt. Critics pilloried</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
him with appellations such as 'dictator', 'NU's fuehrer', 'kiai</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
pemecah umat' (literally, the Islamic leader who split the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
community of believers) and kiai Nasakom (a derogatory</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
reference to his role in supporting Sukarno's coalition of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
nationalist, religious and communist groups).</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The purpose of this article is to describe and assess Wahab's</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
career and contribution to Indonesian Islam and politics. I will</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
seek to show that whilst there were questionable aspects to his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
character and actions, he nonetheless had a profound impact on</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
traditional Islam from the late 1910s and, to a lesser extent, on</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
national politics in the 1950s and early 1960s. The article is</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
largely biographical with particular attention given to two</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
periods when his influence was most widely felt: the 1920s and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1950-60. In the former period it will chart his initial rise to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
prominence as an advocate of traditionalist Muslim values and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
interests, culminating in the formation of Nahdlatul Ulama, and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in the latter, it will examine his term as rais am (president-</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
general) of NU.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
There are considerable historiographical obstacles to writing</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
an account of Wahab Chasbullah's life. He wrote little for</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
publication and the surviving primary documentary evidence</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
consists of only a few transcripts of speeches and debates, some</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
reprinted letters, and an assortment of brief quotations in the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
press. In the scholarly literature on Indonesian Islam, he</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
receives, somewhat undeservedly, only brief mention. As a result</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the material for this study is drawn largely from literature</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
produced by NU writers, much of it hagiographic, and oral</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
evidence obtained from interviews with those who knew him.3</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Contradictory information abounds in both of these sources.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Early Life</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Although the general outline of Wahab Chasbullah's early life</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
is reasonably clear, accurate dating of his movements prior to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1920 is extremely problematic. None of the data in the available</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
biographical accounts of these years offers an internally</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
consistent chronology.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab was born at his family's pesantren (traditional Islamic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
school) at Tambakberas, Jombang, East Java. The birth date is</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
suggesting that the actual date may have been 1881 or 1884.4 He</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
was the eldest of eight children,5 and his father, Chasbullah, was a</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
wealthy kiai (religious teacher and scholar) and trader. His family</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
contained many notable ulama and also boasted aristocratic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
origins.6 His great-grandfather was Kiai Sihah, the founder of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Tambakberas.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
His upbringing and education were typical of a young santri</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(Muslim student) and aspiring ulama. He was raised at his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
family's pesantren and from the age of seven received basic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
religious instruction, including Arabic and Qu'ranic recitation,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
from his father. At 13 'Gus Dul', as he was known to family and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
friends, embarked on the life of a santri kelana ('wandering</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
student'), travelling from one pesantren to another gaining</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
religious knowledge. At each pesantren the santri kelana would</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
study the particular texts and branches of Islamic learning in</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
which that kiai specialised. Apart from its didactic aims this</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
period as a 'wandering student' was also seen as a rite of passage</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
from childhood to manhood during which time the santri would</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
gain a sense of independence and self-knowledge. Over the next</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
15 years, Wahab studied at seven different pesantren in east and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
central Java.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
During this time he studied under two of the most influential</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Javanese ulama of the modern era: Kiai Cholil of Kademangan,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Bangkalan, Madura, and Kiai Hasjim Asj'ari of Tebuireng,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Jombang. In the latter part of the nineteenth century and early</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
twentieth century Cholil was renowned for his charismatic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
teaching and magical powers. Hasjim Asj'ari, a prize student of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Cholil's, enjoyed a high reputation for his rigorous intellect,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
piety and deep knowledge of Islamic law and hadis (traditions of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the Prophet Muhammad). Both of these ulama attracted santri</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
from throughout the archipelago to their pesantren. Wahab</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
spent three years at Kademangan and four at Tebuireng, rising,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
at the latter, to the rank of lurah pondok (effectively, manager</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
of the pesantren's daily affairs).7 It was at these pesantren, that</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab met many future leading ulama including Kiai Bisri</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Syansuri, who would become his brother-in-law and successor to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the NU leadership, Kiai Abdul Karim, the founder of Lirboyo</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
pesantren in Kediri, Kiai Abbas from Buntet, and Kiai As'ad</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Syamsul Arifin of Situbondo.8</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
An early indication of Wahab's outlook and temperament</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
can be gained from accounts of his role in the discussion classes</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
or kelas musyawarah for senior santri at Tebuireng. At these</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
sessions various jurisprudential issues would be discussed, with</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
santri being expected to prepare arguments based on references</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
to the classical texts, the kitab kuning (lit. 'yellow books'). In</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
contrast to most of his colleagues, who adopted a strictly textual</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and legalistic approach, Wahab advocated practical and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
contextual solutions to the application Of Islamic law. He argued</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
that religious law should not be based solely on jurisprudential</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
texts but must also be sensitive to social conditions. There was</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
little point, he said, in issuing legal opinions which ordinary</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Muslims did not understand or would not follow. His calls for</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
compromise in the application of the law generated spirited</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
discussion at the kelas musyawarah with his good friend, Bisri</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Syansuri, a frequent disputant. Hasjim Asj'ari, who would often</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
attend these sessions to offer comments, was also critical of his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
approach.9 Despite the disapprobation of his colleagues and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
teacher, Wahab held steadfastly to his views. This combination</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
of wilfulness and realism would become hallmarks of his career.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
During these years as a santri kelana Wahab studied various</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
aspects of Islam including dogmatic theology (tauhid),</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
jurisprudence (fiqh) and roots of jurisprudence (usul fiqh), Arabic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
literature, and pronunciation and recitation of the Qu'ran</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(tajwid). Aside from religious studies, he showed a keen interest</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in politics and current affairs and would often engage in long</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
debates with his fellow santri on these matters. He also enjoyed</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
physical activities, most notably the indigenous martial art</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
pencak silat. This was a favoured sport in pesantren and,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
although of short, wiry build, Wahab was said to be a game and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
skilled exponent.10</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
At about 27 years of age Wahab completed his Islamic</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
education by travelling to Mecca to undertake the pilgrimage and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
further study. He was to spend five years there studying with</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
various eminent teachers including Kiai Mahfudz Termas, Kiai</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Baqir Yogya, Kiai Muchtaram Banyumas and the most senior of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
all Indonesian ulama in the Hijaz, Syekh Ahmad Chatib from</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Minangkabau.11 Typically though, Wahab did not restrict</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
himself to Islamic learning. He socialised widely with Malay and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Javanese students in Mecca and became active in politics. During</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
his stay there (probably in late 1913) Wahab, along with three</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
colleagues, founded a Meccan branch of the Indonesian political</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
movement, Sarekat Islam.12</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Traditionalist Leader</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab returned from Mecca probably in late 1914 or 1915</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
when in his early 30s.13 The next ten years were a critical period</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in his personal development and public career. Rather than</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
return to Tambakberas to teach and assist in the running of his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
father's pesantren, as was customary for an aspiring kiai, he</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
decided to reside in the bustling port city of Surabaya. The</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
cloistered and routinised nature of pesantren life probably held</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
little allure for the energetic and ambitious Wahab. Surabaya, by</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
contrast, was the second largest metropolis in the Netherlands</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Indies and boasted a cosmopolitan society and thriving</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
commercial environment. It was also a major centre of political</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
activity in the 1910s with Sarekat Islam, the leftist Indische</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (ISDV) and numerous other</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
organisations having their headquarters there.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab soon immersed himself in a diverse range of activities</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in Surabaya. In 1916 he married the first of his many wives, the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
daughter of Kiai Musa, a prosperous businessman and religious</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
teacher in the suburb of Kertopaten, and began teaching at his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
father-in-law's Qu'ranic school.14 In the same year, he co-</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
founded, with Mas Mansoer, a madrasah (Islamic school with</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
grades and modern-style syllabus) called Nahdlatul Wathan</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(Revival of the Homeland). Wahab served as the head of its</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
teaching council and was joined by close colleagues such as Bisri</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Syansuri, Abdul Halim Leimunding and Abdullah Ubaid.15</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab also established himself as a trader. He dealt initially</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in rice and wheat from his family's farm at Tambakberas, but</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
later diversified into sugar and precious stones.16 In 1918 he</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
helped to found a commercial cooperative amongst Muslims</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
from Jombang and Surabaya. Called Nahdlatul Tujar (Revival of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the Traders), Wahab held the important positions of Treasurer</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and legal adviser with Hasjim Asj'ari as chairman.17 Though</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
short-lived the venture was a forerunner of many subsequent </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(and often ill-fated) attempts to create a trading network within</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the traditionalist Islamic community.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab's most lucrative business activity was that of syekh</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
haj or hajj agent, arranging Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca.18 He</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
began working in Kiai Musa's thriving hall agency in the late</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1910s but also used connections which he had made with several</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Arab shaikhs in Jeddah and Mecca during his stay in the Hijaz</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
After his father-in-law's death, he assumed control of the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
business and soon became a major agent for the Kongsi Tiga</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
shipping line.19 His involvement in hajj matters was later to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
prove controversial as allegations of inept or corrupt practices</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
were made against him.20</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
But perhaps his most important activity in the late 1910s and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1920s was his participation in various religious and political</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
groups. Wahab mixed widely in the world of Surabayan politics.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
A gregarious man who enjoyed debating issues and matching wits</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
with others, he was well suited to political life. Unlike some of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
his fellow traditionalists, who regarded politics with disdain,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab believed it to be a fitting and, indeed, necessary activity</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
for Muslims. 'Islam and politics are as inseparable as sugar and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
sweetness', he would often say.21 He remained active in Sarekat</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Islam (SI) at least until the early 1920s and seems to have been</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
one of the young Muslims drawn into the circle of H.O.S.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Tjokroaminoto, the charismatic SI leader. This would have</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
brought Wahab into contact with prominent figures of the time</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and many future political leaders as well, including Agus Salim, Ki</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Hadjar Dewantoro, W. Wondoamiseno, Hendrik Sneevliet,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Alimin, Muse, Abikusno Tjokrosujuso, and the young Sukarno,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
who was then boarding in Tjokroaminoto's house.22</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Within the Islamic community of East Java, this was a time</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
of growing polarisation between traditionalists and modernists.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
since the early 1910s, the modernist movement had expanded</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
rapidly, particularly through organisations such as</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Muhammadiyah and Al-Irsyad. By the latter part of the decade</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
rivalry between the two streams grew as the modernists won</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
increasing support from within traditionalist strongholds along</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the north coast region and in eastern Java. This modernist</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
advance posed a two-fold threat to the position of traditionalist</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
ulama: firstly, their authority as religious leaders was challenged</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
by modernist charges of 'un-Islamic' traditionalist practices and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
advocacy of informed personal interpretation of scripture</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(ijtihad); and secondly, the economic activities of their families</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and pesantren were jeopardised by modernist recruiting of well-</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
to-do Muslim traders and landowners.23</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab soon emerged as a principal figure in the traditionalist</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
response to this threat. One of his earliest initiatives was to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
establish a Muslim discussion group called Taswirul Afkar</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
(Constellation of Thoughts) in 1918 with the prominent</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Surabayan ulama KH Achmad Dachlan of Kebondalam.24</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Taswirul Afkar became well known for organising debates on</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
religious problems and particularly issues such as ijtihad and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
taqlid (acceptance of the legal interpretations of ulama). It was</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
significant as the first formal grouping where modernists and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
traditionalists met to discuss such controversial matters.25</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Wahab featured prominently at gatherings such as these. A</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
vigorous and colourful debater, he was adept at blending serious</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
discussions of principle or law with witty anecdotes or apposite</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
stories from Islamic scripture and history. Although supportive</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
of modernist efforts at educational and social reforms, he</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
rejected their attacks on Sunni Orthodoxy and the primacy of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
ulama. It was the ulama, he would constantly remind his</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
listeners, who were the legatees of the Prophet (pewaris nabi)</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and guardians of Islamic law. It was their meticulous scholarship</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in the sources and interpretation of religious law during the 9-</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
11th centuries which had resulted in the establishment of the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
four Sunni law schools and an authoritative codification of the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Syariah (Islamic law). Modern-day ulama continued this</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
tradition of erudition and legal guidance. They alone possessed</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the necessary training and knowledge to interpret Islamic law, he</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
argued. If non-ulama were to assume this role, as proposed by</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
modernists, misinterpretations of the Syariah could arise leading</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Muslims to commit, unwittingly, improper or sinful acts.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
During the early 1920s, Wahab's profile rose with the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
growing rivalry between traditionalists and modernists. He would</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
often engage in public debates with eminent modernists such as</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
KH Achmad Dachlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, and Al-</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Irsyad's Syekh Achmad Soerkati.26 In 1921 Muhammadiyah</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
established a branch in Surabaya and Achmad Dachlan succeeded</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
in convincing Mas Mansoer, who had previously had family and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
professional links with both modernists and traditionalists, to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
join the organisation. Relations between Wahab and Mansoer</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
seem to have deteriorated from this time, with the latter leaving</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Nahdlatul Wathan in 1922.27 The two thereafter became the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
leading spokesmen for their respective causes in Surabaya,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
engaging in debate at a variety of forums, and gathering around</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
them contingents of loyal followers.28</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1922 also saw Wahab embroiled in controversy at the first</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Al-Islam Congress held in Cirebon, West Java. Attempts to find</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
common ground on reform of the Islamic education system and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
pre-requisites for ijtihad were only partly successful, leading to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
sharp exchanges between Wahab and various Al-Irsyad and</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Muhammadiyah delegates. The debate descended into mutual</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
denunciations with the modernists accusing the traditionalists of</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
polytheism (syirk) and the traditionalists branding the modernists</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
as unbelievers (kafir).29 The traditionalists left the congress</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
deeply mistrustful of the modernists' motives and took no</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
further part in the organisation of subsequent Al-Islam</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
congresses.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Relations between the two groups worsened further in 1924 as</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the Indonesian umat endeavoured to find a united response to</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
two pressing international issues: the future of the caliphate</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
following the Turkish parliament's abolition of that institution,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and the capture of Mecca by the Wahhabi leader, Abdul-Aziz ibn</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Saud. Two world Islamic congresses were scheduled to deal with</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
these issues, the first in Cairo in 1925 and the second in Mecca</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the following year. At the third Indies Al-Islam Congress held in</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Surabaya in December 1924 Wahab was chosen as the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
traditionalist representative on a three-member Indonesian</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
*******</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1 Formally, Wahab's full name was Abdul Wahab Chasbullah though the</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
spelling Hasbullah was also in common use.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
2 The term 'traditionalist' refers to those Muslims who adhere to the</div>
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teachings of one of the four Sunni Schools of Law (mazhab) and are also inclined towards syncretic devotional practices. 'Modernist' Muslims, by contrast, do not acknowledge a priori the authority of any particular mazhab and instead regard the Qur'an and (example of the prophet Muhammad) as the paramount sources of law. They are also</div>
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highly critical of Muslims practising rituals of a non-islamic origin.</div>
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<br /></div>
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3 The main published source for biographical and anecdotal information is Saifuddin Zuhri, a loyal follower of Wahab. His Kyai Haji Abdulwahab Chasbullah. Bapak dan Pendiri NU, Yamunu, Jakarta, 1972, written to mark the 100-day anniversary of Wahab's death, is effusively eulogistic Saifuddin's Berangkat dari Pesantren, Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 19871 also contains numerous references to Wahab. The interview material used in this study was gathered during field research in Indonesia between June 1991 and July 1992, and in November and December 1994.</div>
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<br /></div>
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4 Most accounts of Wahab's birth date and early life seem to be sourced</div>
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from Aboebakar's Sedjarah Hidup KHA. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan</div>
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Tersiar, Panitya Buku Peringatan aim. KHA. Wahid Hasjim, Jakarta,</div>
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1957 (p. 121) or less commonly, Parlaungan's Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen</div>
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di Republik Indonesia, C.V. Gita, Jakarta, 1956 (p. 214). Both give the 1888 date for Wahab's birth, based presumably on information provided or approved by him.</div>
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The reasons for questioning this date are numerous. When Wahab</div>
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died in 1971, his age was stated to be about 88, thus implying he was</div>
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born circa 1883. He was also known to be several years older than his</div>
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close friend and brother-in-law, Bisri Syansuri, whose birth date was</div>
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almost certainly 18 September 1886. Finally, further support for an</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
earlier birth date comes from the chronology of Wahab's early life in</div>
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Aboebakar. It suggests that he spent some 20 years from the age of 13</div>
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gaining an Islamic education from various teachers in Java and later</div>
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Mecca (p.122) before settling in Surabaya when about 32. Given that</div>
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Wahab had returned from the Middle-East by 1916, this indicates a birth date of about 1883-84.</div>
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Although it would seem surprising that he would allow an incorrect</div>
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birth date to be circulated, Wahab seems to have been little concerned with historical details.</div>
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</div>
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5 Buku Informasi Pondok Pesantren Al-Lathifiyyah, Bahrul 'Ulum,</div>
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Tambakberas, Pesantren Al-Lathifiyyah BU, Jombang, n.d., p.18.</div>
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</div>
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6 His family claimed descent from King Brawijaya VI, one of the last (semi-mythical) rulers of Majapahit, and Jaka Tingkir, the sultan of the Sixteenth-century state of Pajang. See Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p.141. Wahab sometimes appended the aristocratic title 'Raden' to his name.</div>
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<br /></div>
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7 Aboebakar, p.121; and Abdurrahman Wahid, Kiai Bisri Syansuri</div>
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Pecinta Fiqh Sepanjang Hayat, Amanah, Jakarta, 1989, p.8.</div>
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<br /></div>
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8 Aboebakar, p.122; and Abdurrahman Wahid, p.26.</div>
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<br /></div>
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9 Abdurrahman Wahid, p. 24; and interviews with KH Abdulwahab</div>
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Turcham, Surabaya, 3 November 1991, Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5</div>
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October 1991 and Zaini Dachlan, Jombang, 7 December 1994. For a</div>
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description of the kelas musyawarah see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi</div>
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Pesantren, LP3ES, Jakarta, 1982, p. 31. The best account of the</div>
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contrasting approaches to Islamic jurisprudence of Wahab and Bisri can be found in Aziz Masyhuri, AI Maghfur-lah KHM Bishri Syansuri, Al</div>
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Ikhlas, Surabaya, 1983, pp. 58-62.</div>
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<br /></div>
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10 Aboebakar, p. 121; Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 23; and interviews</div>
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with Hasib Wahab (Wahab's son), Jombang, 28 October 1991 and</div>
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Hasyim Latief, Sepanjang, 19 September 1991.</div>
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<br /></div>
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11 Aboebakar, p. 123.</div>
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<br /></div>
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12 Abdurrahman Wahid, pp. 15-16; Aziz Masyhuri, p. 29; and A. P. E.</div>
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Korver, Sarekat (slam 1912-1916: Opkomst bloei en structuur van</div>
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Indonesie's eerste massa beweging, Historisch Seminarium van de</div>
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Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 1982, p. 77, n. 119.</div>
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Some sources incorrectly state 1917 as the date for his homecoming (for example, Abdurrahman Wahid, p. 15). There can be little doubt that he had returned by 1915. Following the outbreak of the First World War, the Dutch government repatriated most Indonesians in the Hijaz. This was completed by early 1915 and shipping links between the East Indies and Jeddah did not resume until 1919. (See Martin van</div>
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Bruinessen, 'Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate</div>
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Question', Les Annales de l'Autre Islam, no. 2, 1994, pp. 263-5ยท)</div>
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Wahab must have returned prior to the cessation of shipping as Dutch</div>
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official documents from 1916 include him amongst the office-bearers of an Islamic school. Aboebakar also relates that Wahab was married in Surabaya by 1916 (p. 122).</div>
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<br /></div>
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14 Aboebakar, p. 125; and interview with Umroh Machfudzoh (Wahab's</div>
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granddaughter), Yogyakarta, 2 January 1992.</div>
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<br /></div>
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15 Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama,</div>
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Jatayu Sala, Solo, 1985, p. 25; Soebagijo I. N., KH Mas Mansur:</div>
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Pembaharu Islam di Indonesia, Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 1982, p. 21;</div>
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and Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 25. Branches of Nahdlatul Wathan</div>
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<br /></div>
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16 Were opened in other Javanese cities during the next decade.</div>
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Interviews with Zaini and Ridlwan Dachlan, Jombang, 7 December 1994</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
17 A copy of the original declaration of Nahdlatul Tujar's formation is held in the Lakpesdam library, Jakarta. According to Abdurrahman Wahid (p.23), the impetus for founding Nahdlatul Tujar came from Wahab, even though the original document accredits this role to Hasjim Asj'ari.</div>
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<br /></div>
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18 A syekh haj would be paid by intending pilgrims to handle travel and</div>
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accommodation arrangements as well as give religious guidance.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
19 Interviews with Umroh Machfudzoh, Yogyakarta, 2 January 1992: 1(11.</div>
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Amynulloh, Jombang, 8 December 1994; and Ridlwan Dachlan,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Jombang, 7 December 1994. Also, Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1912, Oxford University Press.</div>
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Singapore, 1973, p. 229; and Soebagijo I. N., K. H Masjkur, Gunung</div>
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Agung, Jakarta, 1982, p. 19.</div>
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<br /></div>
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20 Allegations and rumours of Wahab's mismanagement of hajj funds were</div>
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commonplace in modernist circles and newspapers. Establishing the</div>
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validity of such claims is almost impossible. It is noteworthy though</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
that in traditionalist circles he enjoyed a good reputation as a syekh haj and maintained a busy agency until the late 1950s.</div>
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Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab, p. 30.</div>
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<br /></div>
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22 Abdurrahman Wahid, p. 24; J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political</div>
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Biography, George Alien and Unwin, Sydney, 1971, pp.54-55;</div>
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Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Menelusuri Jejak Ayahku, Arsip Nasional RI,</div>
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Jakarta, 1983, pp. 5 and 34; and Saleh Said, Kiyai Mas Mansur.</div>
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Membuka dan Menutup Sejarahnya, Usaha Penerbitan Budi, Surabaya,</div>
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n.d., p. 6.</div>
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<br /></div>
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23 Noer, p. 226.</div>
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<br /></div>
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24 Not to be confused with KH Achmad Dachlan from Yogyakarta, the</div>
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founder of Muhammadiyah. Aboebakar, p. 469; Anam, p. 27; and M. Ali</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Haidar, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia. Pendekatan Fikih</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
dalam Polirik, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1993, p 43.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
25 Dhofier, p. 27; and Soebagijo, Masjkur, p. 18.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
26 Aboebakar, pp. 470-1; Anam, p. 30; and Saifuddin Zuhri, Abdulwahab</div>
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p.26.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
27 Mansoer became one of Muhammadiyah's most influential figures during</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the 1930s and served as its chairman-general from 1937 to 1942.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
28 Syubbanul Wathan, an organisation established by the younger</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
traditionalist members of Nahdlatul Wathan, was well known for its</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Staunchly pro-Wahab views. The leaders of Syubbanul Wathan included</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
such future NU leaders as Abdullah Ubaid, Tohir Bari, Abdul Halim</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Leuwimunding, and Nawawi (Jagalan). Anam, p. 31; Aboebakar, p.470;</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
and interview with Zaini Dachlan and Muhammad Madchan, Jombang, 8</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
December 1994.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
29 I am grateful to Natalie Mobini-Kesheh for providing information from</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the official Dutch report on this congress (Mailrapport 85x/23) held at the Algemeen Rijkarchief (The Hague), Ministry of Colonies. Also,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Neratja, 4 and 7 November 1922; and Noer, p. 227.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-3907933843415684912015-03-08T07:30:00.000+07:002015-03-08T07:30:00.988+07:00Philosophy #12<span style="background-color: white; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 26px; letter-spacing: 0.259999990463257px; line-height: 32px; white-space: pre-wrap;">"To love rightly is to love what is orderly and beautiful in an educated and disciplined way." #Plato</span>Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-40654815699378777532015-03-03T20:59:00.001+07:002015-03-03T20:59:41.798+07:00Philosophy #11Search well and be wise, and never believe that self-willed pride is better than good counsel. #AeschylusHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-12191340582815914292015-03-02T09:09:00.000+07:002015-03-02T09:09:00.500+07:00Philosophy #10How much easier it is to be critical than to be correct. #Benjamin DisraeliHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-8625530997312456942015-03-01T21:39:00.002+07:002015-03-01T21:39:27.454+07:00Philosophy #9<span style="background-color: #f5f8fa; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; line-height: 18px; white-space: pre-wrap;">A successful man is one who can lay a firm foundation with the bricks others have thrown at him. #David Brinkley</span>Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-90189047032237927332015-03-01T07:56:00.000+07:002015-03-01T07:56:00.779+07:00Philosophy #8Every man would like to be God; some find it difficult to admit the impossibility. #Bertrand RussellHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-89767669998595063822015-02-27T20:20:00.000+07:002015-02-27T20:20:03.253+07:00Philosophy #7Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it finds its rest in thee. #AugustineHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-52242201835051651902015-02-26T16:30:00.000+07:002015-02-26T16:30:00.879+07:00Philosophy #6<span style="background-color: white; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 26px; letter-spacing: 0.259999990463257px; line-height: 32px; white-space: pre-wrap;">The man who waits for roasted duck to fly into mouth must wait very long time. #Ancient Proverb</span>Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-25557535619717013172015-02-26T09:30:00.000+07:002015-02-26T09:30:00.876+07:00Philosophy #5<span style="background-color: white; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; line-height: 22px; white-space: pre-wrap;">Few look for truth; many prowl about for a reputation of profundity by arrogantly challenging whichever arguments seem best. #Descartes</span>Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-90029243891721402132015-02-26T07:00:00.000+07:002015-02-26T07:00:08.389+07:00Philosophy #4<span style="background-color: white; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 26px; letter-spacing: 0.259999990463257px; line-height: 32px; white-space: pre-wrap;">We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark. The real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light. #Plato</span>Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-13717759015196515162015-02-22T12:06:00.001+07:002015-02-22T12:06:06.291+07:00Philosophy #3A gem cannot be polished without friction, nor a man perfected without trials. #SenecaHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-29856069850211249592015-02-11T10:00:00.000+07:002015-02-11T10:00:01.500+07:00Philosophy #2<span style="background-color: white; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 26px; letter-spacing: 0.259999990463257px; line-height: 32px; white-space: pre-wrap;">To be yourself in a world that is constantly trying to make you something else is the greatest accomplishment. #Emerson</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #292f33; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 26px; letter-spacing: 0.259999990463257px; line-height: 32px; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span>Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-83203948867482423372015-02-07T09:30:00.000+07:002015-02-07T09:30:01.599+07:00PhilosophyAll happiness or unhappiness solely depends upon the quality of the object to which we are attached by love. #SpinozaHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-44581485334420885962015-02-07T08:00:00.000+07:002015-02-07T08:00:03.506+07:00PhilosophyMan wishes to be happy even when he so lives as to make happiness impossible. #AugustineHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-2824882075410535802015-02-07T00:15:00.000+07:002015-02-07T00:15:12.397+07:00Philosophy #1Sometimes people don't want to hear the truth because they don't want their illusions destroyed. #NietzscheHaris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1625793685705097938.post-37997584111812086322015-02-03T03:45:00.000+07:002015-02-03T03:46:20.522+07:00Panduan Mudah Daftar di TRAFFICMONSOON<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiG2ENB-sn9i8BPcnfeBJkYm3aeFKu1SLDYlsPybkBsShRrd8qqqm-FEyKiaEhzfV1vwuc_1j3iENDFhBDmYDKD3WHD49U2iqXIMrW98x6klAkDFvlCbgavh-ZMxoS4zs-39M3Jf0I2Zw/s1600/4.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiG2ENB-sn9i8BPcnfeBJkYm3aeFKu1SLDYlsPybkBsShRrd8qqqm-FEyKiaEhzfV1vwuc_1j3iENDFhBDmYDKD3WHD49U2iqXIMrW98x6klAkDFvlCbgavh-ZMxoS4zs-39M3Jf0I2Zw/s1600/4.png" height="98" width="320" /></a></div>
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5. Tunggu hingga muncul tulisan "BACK TO DASHBOARD". maka kita akan dibawa kehalaman akun kita...TIAARRRAAA...ehh TAAARRRAA...BERHASIL..BERHASIL..HHE<br />
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SEKIAN PANDUANNYA SEMOGA BERMANFAAT & MUDAH DIMENGERTI. SILAKAN DITANYAKAN JIKA KURANG FAHAM ATAU MAU KASIH SARAN MONGGO KOMENG!!<br />
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baca cara <a href="http://hamuzamurmur.blogspot.com/2015/02/dapat-dollar-gratis.html">DAPAT DOLLAR GRATIS!!</a> dari PTC TrafficMonsoon</div>
Haris Muzakkihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14565332933405960443noreply@blogger.com0